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AN ANALYSIS OF SECTIONS 11D(1)(A) AND 11D(5)(B) OF THE INCOME TAX 
ACT NO. 58 OF 1962 AS AMENDED 
In February 2007 section 11D was inserted into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as 
amended.  The aim of the section was to encourage private-sector investment in 
scientific or technological research and development (R&D). This was an indirect 
approach by National Treasury to increase national scientific and technological R&D 
expenditure in order to complement government expenditure on the subject matter.   
Although section 11D provides generous income tax incentives, the interpretation 
thereof was found to be a hindrance in attaining the goal sought by National 
Treasury.  This is due to the fact that this section demands a firm grasp of intellectual 
property (IP) law, principles of tax, and technology in general.  This is clearly shown 
by the lapse in time (i.e. three years) between the passing of section 11D into law 
and the release of the South African Revenue Services’ (SARS) final interpretation of 
section 11D, i.e. Interpretation Note 50.  
The release of Interpretation Note 50 in August 2009 sparked wide-spread 
controversy among many a patent attorneys and tax consultants.  The interpretation 
of the section by SARS was found by many to be so draconian that it destroyed the 
incentive entirely. 
The objective of this study is to provide greater clarity on the areas of section 11D 
which have been found to be onerous to taxpayers.  Hence the meaning of “new” 
and “non-obvious” in the context of a discovery of information as eligible R&D 
activity1 was examined.  Hereafter the ambit of the exclusion of expenditure on 
“management or internal business process”2 from eligibility for the incentive in the 
context of computer program development was examined.  
It was established that the meaning of “novel” and “non-obvious” as construed by IP 
jurisprudence could mutatis mutandis be adopted for purposes of interpreting section 
11D(1) of the Income Tax Act.  Therefore, information would be regarded as “new” if 
it did not form part of the state of the art immediately prior to the date of its discovery.  
                                                 
1
 Refer section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
2
  Refer section 11D(5)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
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The state of the art was found to comprise all matter which had been made available 
to the public (both in the Republic and elsewhere) by written or oral description, by 
use or in any other way.  Information would also be regarded as non-obvious if an 
ordinary person, skilled in the art, faced with the same problem, would not have 
easily solved the problem presented to him by having sole reliance on his 
intelligence and what was regarded as common knowledge in the art at the time of 
the discovery. 
It was submitted that in construing the meaning of the “management or internal 
business process” exclusion, the intention of the lawgiver should be sought and 
given effect to.  The Explanatory Memorandum issued on the introduction of section 
11D states that the lawgiver’s intention with the section was to ensure that South 
Africa is not at a global disadvantage concerning R&D.  The R&D tax legislation of 
Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada was therefore examined to establish the 
international bar set in this regard. 
SARS is of the view that the “management or internal business process” exclusion 
applies to the development of any computer program (with the said application) 
irrespective of whether the program is developed for the purpose of in-house use, 
sale or licensing.  However, it was found that such a restrictive interpretation would 
place homebound computer development at a severe disadvantage when compared 
with the legislation of the above mentioned countries.  In order to give effect to the 
intention of legislature, it was submitted that the exclusion provision should be 
construed to only include the development of computer programs for in-house 
management or internal business process use.  Computer programs developed for 
the said application, but for the purpose of being sold or licensed to an unrelated 
third party, should still be eligible for the R&D tax incentive.   
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‘N ANALISE VAN ARTIKELS 11D(1)(A) EN 11D(5)(B) VAN DIE 
INKOMSTEBELASTINGWET NO. 58 VAN 1962 SOOS GEWYSIG 
Artikel 11D is gevoeg tot die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962 gedurende 
Februarie 2007.   Die wetgewing het ten doel om privaatsektor investering in 
tegniese en wetenskaplike navorsing en ontwikkeling (N&O) aan te moedig.  
Nasionale Tesourie dra dus op ‘n indirekte wyse by tot die hulpbronne wat die 
regering op nasionale vlak aan tegniese en wetenskaplike N&O bestee in ‘n 
gesamentlike poging om N&O in Suid-Afrika te stimuleer. 
 
Artikel 11D hou op die oog af baie gunstige inkomstebelasting aansporings in.  Dit 
wil egter voorkom asof die interpretasie daarvan as ernstige struikelblok dien in die 
bereiking van die doel wat Nasionale Tesourie voor oë gehad het.  Dit kan 
toegeskryf word aan die feit dat die artikel ‘n wesenlike begrip van intellektuele 
eiendom (IE) wetgewing, belasting beginsels en tegnologie in die algemeen vereis.  
Die feit dat dit die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstebelastingdiens (SAID) ongeveer drie jaar 
geneem het om hul interpretasie (i.e. Interpretasienota 50) van die artikel te 
finaliseer dien as bewys hiervan.   
Die SAID het gedurende Augustus 2009, Interpretasienota 50 vrygestel.  Die nota 
het wye kritiek ontlok by menigte IE prokureurs en belastingkonsultante.  Daar is 
algemene konsensus dat die SAID se interpretasie so drakonies van aard is, dat dit 
enige aansporing wat die artikel bied, geheel en al uitwis. 
Die doel van hierdie studie is om die problematiese bepalings van die 
aansporingsartikel te verlig en groter sekerheid daaroor te verskaf.  Gevolglik is die 
betekenis van “nuut” en “nie-ooglopend” soos van toepassing op ‘n ontdekking van 
inligting as kwalifiserende N&O aktiwiteit,3 bestudeer.   Verder is die omvang van die 
bepaling wat besteding op “bestuur of interne besigheidsprosesse”4 uitsluit van 
kwalifikasie vir die aansporingsinsentief, bestudeer in die konteks van rekenaar 
programmatuur ontwikkeling.   
                                                 
3
  Verwys na artikel 11D(1)(a) van die Inkomstebelastingwet. 
4
  Verwys na artikel 11D(5)(b) van die Inkomstebelastingwet. 
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By nadere ondersoek is daar bevind dat die betekenis van “nuut” en “nie-ooglopend” 
soos uitgelê vir doeleindes van IE wetgewing mutatis mutandis aangeneem kan 
word vir die uitleg van artikel 11D(1)(a) van die Inkomstebelastingwet.  Vervolgens 
word inligting as “nuut” beskou indien dit nie deel uitmaak van die stand van die 
tegniek onmiddellik voor die datum waarop dit ontdek is nie.  Die stand van die 
tegniek vir die bepaling van nuutheid behels alle stof wat reeds aan die publiek 
beskikbaar gestel is (hetsy binne die Republiek of elders) by wyse van skriftelike of 
mondelinge beskrywing, deur gebruik of op enige ander wyse.  Inligting word as nie-
ooglopend beskou indien ‘n gewone werker wat bedrewe is in die tegniek en 
gekonfronteer is met dieselfde probleem, nie geredelik die antwoord tot die probleem 
sou vind deur bloot staat te maak op sy intelligensie en die algemene kennis in die 
bedryf op die tydstip van die ontdekking nie.   
Daar is aan die hand gedoen dat die doel van die wetgewer nagestreef moet word 
met die uitleg van die “bestuur of interne besigheidsprosesse” uitsluiting. Die 
Verklarende Memorandum wat uitgereik is met die bekendstelling van artikel 11D het 
gemeld dat die wetgewer ten doel gehad het om Suid Afrika op ‘n gelyke speelveld 
met die res van die wêreld te plaas wat betref N&O.  Die N&O belastingbepalings 
van Australië, die Verenigde Koninkryk (VK) en Kanada is dus bestudeer om die 
internasionale standaard in die opsig vas te stel. 
Die SAID is van mening dat die strekwydte van die uitsluiting so omvangryk is dat dit 
alle rekenaar programmatuur wat ontwikkel is vir ‘n bestuur- of interne 
besigheidsproses toepassing tref, ten spyte daarvan dat die bedoeling van die 
belastingpligtige was om die programmatuur te verkoop of te lisensieer aan ‘n 
onverbonde derde party.  Dit was egter bevind dat so ‘n beperkende uitleg  die 
aansporing van rekenaar programmatuur ontwikkeling in Suid Afrika geweldig 
benadeel in vergelyking met die regime wat geld in lande soos Australië, die VK en 
Kanada.  Ten einde gevolg te gee aan die bedoeling van die wetgewer, is daar aan 
die hand gedoen dat die uitsluiting slegs so ver moet strek as om rekenaar 
programme vir eie gebruik te diskwalifiseer.  Rekenaar programme wat dus 
ontwikkel word met die doel om dit te verkoop of te lisensieer aan onverbonde derde 
partye moet steeds vir die aansporingsinsentief kwalifiseer. 
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“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, would it?”  
~ Albert Einstein5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
  BookRags Media Network “Research Quotes” BrainyQuote 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/research.html  (accessed 29-07-2010).  
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1.1. Background 
In August 2002, the Department of Trade and Industry released a statement which 
introduced South Africa’s National Research & Development Strategy.6  In this 
document it was stated that science and technology is critical to the process of 
sustainable development in South Africa. It was further acknowledged that there is 
increasing evidence that the existing policy frameworks for development have 
significantly underestimated the importance of science and technology and, as a 
result, development policies have not led to sustainable outcomes, or improved the 
quality of life for marginalised people of the developing world.7   
At the time this strategy was compiled, South Africa only undertook some 0.5% of 
global research.8  In a country known for its bountiful natural resources, this certainly 
speaks of an under utilisation of the research and development (R&D) opportunities 
our country holds.  In acknowledgement of this fact, a strategy was compiled by the 
Department of Trade and Industry which aimed to enable economic growth and 
social development through increasing expenditure on R&D in South Africa. 
In an attempt to synchronise governmental efforts in achieving this goal, National 
Treasury introduced tax legislation in 2006 as an incentive to increase expenditure 
on R&D in South Africa.  This incentive is found in section 11D of the Income Tax 58 
of 1962.9  The aim of the section was to encourage private-sector investment in 
scientific or technological R&D.  It is an indirect approach by National Treasury to 
                                                 
6
  Government of the Republic of South Africa South Africa’s National Research and Development 
Strategy  (2002)      
7
  Government of the Republic of South Africa South Africa’s National Research and Development 
Strategy  (2002)7.  
8
  Government of the Republic of South Africa South Africa’s National Research and Development 
Strategy  (2002)7. 
9
  Before the introduction of section 11D into the Income Tax Act, section 11B of the said Act allowed 
a hundred per cent deduction for operating R&D expenditure undertaken directly by the taxpayer.  
As per the Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2006 (refer page 8) 
section 11B of the Income Tax Act did not provide substantial incentives.  South Africa accordingly 
needed an improved set of R&D tax incentives to ensure that local R&D was not at a competitive 
global disadvantage.  Hence, section 11D was introduced. 
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increase national scientific and technological R&D expenditure in order to 
complement government expenditure on the subject matter.10   
1.2. Problem statement 
Although section 11D provides generous income tax incentives, the interpretation 
thereof can be a hindrance in attaining the goal sought by National Treasury.    
Darren Margo, registered patent attorney and tax practitioner, reiterates this 
statement in his article11 published in the De Rebus of December 2009.  Here he 
states it as follows:  
“This section is notoriously difficult to interpret and apply, since it demands a firm grasp of 
intellectual property (IP) law, principles of tax, and technology generally.”   
Margo goes on to state that although legislation is drafted by the National Treasury, 
the responsibility for its interpretation lies with the South African Revenue Services 
(SARS).  In this regard SARS released its finalised interpretation note12 on section 
11D during August 2009.  In Margo’s opinion this interpretation note does not stand 
up to scrutiny due to several reasons. Firstly, various views expressed by SARS in 
this note are “glaringly at odds” with the Frascati Manual13 issued by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).  The Frascati 
Manual is highly regarded as the international best practice manual on the subject.  
Although South Africa is not a member of the OECD, it is currently being considered 
for membership of this prestigious organisation.  With this in mind, a view in harmony 
with the OECD is surely well-advised.  Secondly, it is the opinion of Margo that Note 
50 is riddled with misinterpretations of established legal principles especially those 
pertaining to the concept of “novelty” and the law of patents and designs.  In short, 
SARS’s interpretation is in some instances restrictive in nature and therefore 
reduces the ambit of the incentive section to extreme lengths.  Such an interpretation 
                                                 
10
 South African Revenue Services Interpretation Note: No. 50: Section 11D of the Income Tax Act, 
No. 58 of 1962 (2009) 3.   
11
   “An Assault on the Taxpayer and on Practitioners – by SARS” 39-40. 
12
  i.e. Interpretation Note: No. 50: Section 11D of the Income Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962. 
13
  OECD Frascati Manual, Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental 
Development 6
th
 Edition (2002). 
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does not seem to be in harmony with the spirit of the lawgiver and will certainly 
hinder the goal sought to be achieved by Government. 
Fortunately, the interpretation placed on section 11D of the Income Tax Act by Note 
50 is not binding in any instance.14  Note 50 merely serves as a point of reference in 
the interpretation and application of section 11D.  Case law on this section is 
however, not bountiful.  In fact, up to date, no case law is available on the matter.  
This leaves the section open for speculative interpretation until such time that our 
courts are forced to place a binding interpretation thereon.    
1.3. Importance and value of the research 
In the meantime, taxpayers need to complete and submit their tax returns.  
Taxpayers fear that an incorrect interpretation of the R&D section will lead to future 
additional taxes and interest being levied.  Therefore, it is crucial that tax scholars 
provide assistance on the interpretation and application of the section in order to 
assist taxpayers currently filing their tax returns. 
1.4. Objective 
This assignment aims to provide such assistance by conducting an in-depth study 
into the so-called “grey areas” of the section in order to aid the conductors of such 
research and development in the preparation of their tax calculations and tax returns.  
1.5. Research design, methods and scope 
In performing this assignment, a non-empirical method will be followed.  The so-
called “grey areas” of section 11D will be addressed by referring to already published 
data including relevant literature and statutory laws (both foreign and local).   
 
Countries such as the UK, Australia and Canada have dealt with the issues at hand 
on numerous occasions resulting in bountiful jurisprudence and practice statements 
                                                 
14
  In ITC 1572 (1993) 56 SATC 175, Zulman J (as he then was) said: ‘Departmental practice is not 
necessarily, of course, an indication of what the law means. However, it seems to me that the 
departmental practice is a very sensible approach to what should be done in this type of case.  
Plainly the procedure and the practice laid down by the Commissioner in that regard, is, if nothing 
else, commercial wisdom and good sense.’ 
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on the matter.  Furthermore, the OECD has dealt with issues pertaining to the scope 
of R&D ad nauseam. These sources, although being of foreign origins, are 
significant because they carry persuasive value in South African courts.15 
1.6. Legislation forming the object of the research 
The following subsection of section 11D of the Income Tax Act forms the object of 
this study: 
11D (1) For the purposes of determining the taxable income derived by a taxpayer from 
carrying on any trade there shall be allowed as a deduction from the income of such 
taxpayer so derived, an amount equal to 150 per cent of so much of any expenditure 
actually incurred by that taxpayer directly in respect of activities undertaken in the 
Republic directly for purposes of- 
(a) the discovery of novel, practical and non-obvious information, or 
(b) The devising, developing or creation of any- 
(i) … 
(iii) computer program as defined in section 1 of the Copyright Act, 1978 (Act 
No. 98 of 1978); … 
if that information, computer program, … is of a scientific or technological nature, and 
is intended to be used by the taxpayer in the production of his or her income or is 
discovered, devised, developed or created by the taxpayer for purposes of deriving 
income. … 
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no deduction shall be allowed 
in terms of subsection (1) or (2) in respect of expenditure or costs relating to- 
(a)… 
(b) Management or internal business processes; … 
                                                 
15
  Clegg & Stretch  Income Tax in South Africa (2007) 2.4.1. 
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1.7. Outline of the chapters 
The study will be conducted as a two-part enquiry. Firstly, the meaning of “the 
discovery of novel, practical and non-obvious information” will be sought in the 
context of the requirement that the information must be scientific or technological in 
nature.  Secondly, a study will be made to determine to what extent the 
“management and internal business processes” exclusion influences the eligibility of 
expenditure on computer program development for the R&D tax incentive. 
1.7.1. Rules of interpretation governing this study 
Chapter 2 outlines the main rules of interpretation that will govern the construction of 
the first qualifying R&D activity, i.e. “the discovery of novel, practical and non-
obvious information”.   An inquiry into the legislative intent with the enactment of 
section 11D of the Income Tax Act will also be made. 
1.7.2. “Novelty” in terms of IP jurisprudence 
Chapter 3 analyzes the meaning of “new” as determined by IP jurisprudence in 
regards to an invention.  
1.7.3. “Non-obvious” in terms of IP jurisprudence 
Chapter 4 analyzes the meaning of “non-obvious” as determined by IP jurisprudence 
in relation to an invention. 
1.7.4. The meaning of “novel” and “non-obvious” for purposes of the R&D tax 
incentive 
Chapter 5 evaluates whether the meaning of “new” and “non-obvious” as construed 
by IP jurisprudence in relation to an invention can be adopted mutatis mutandis for 
the purposes of the R&D tax incentive relating to the discovery of information.  
Chapter 5 also analyses the ordinary meaning of the words and makes a final 
conclusion on the construction to be awarded to these terms.  
1.7.5. Computer Programs – A contentious issue 
An area proving to be of particular heartache to taxpayers, is determining to what 
extent the “management and internal business processes” exclusion influences the 
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eligibility of expenditure on computer program development for the R&D tax 
incentive.  Chapter 6 examines the interpretation by SARS on this matter and 
compares it to the R&D tax provisions of Australia, Canada and the UK.  The chapter 
concludes with a proposed construction of the exclusion provision.  
1.7.6. Conclusion 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the research as well as the author’s conclusion 
with regards to the two-part enquiry launched as the objective of this study. 
1.8. Conclusion 
Section 11D of the Income Tax Act was introduced during 2006 and passed into law 
in February 2007.16  Since it has been passed, it has been amended seven times.17  
From the many amendments made to this section, it is clear that it is a “living” 
section and is in the process of maturing from its adolescent state of flux.18 
This dissertation aims to expedite this process by removing the uncertainty 
surrounding the section. As a result, investors will be more inclined to increase 
expenditure on R&D activities in South Africa.  This will lead to job-creation and an 
influx of knowledge into the country.  In the long run, such an influx will surely 
contribute to eradicating poverty, thus achieving the goal sought by Government with 
the enactment of this section.  
 
 
                                                 
16
  Section 11D was inserted into the Income Tax Act by section 13 of the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Act No. 20 of 2006. 
17
  Namely, by section 13 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 8 of 2007, section 3 of the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 9 of 2007, section 19 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 
No. 35 of 2007, section 11 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 3 of 2008, section 19 of the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act No. 60 of 2008, section 16 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 
No. 17 of 2009 and section 20 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No.7 of 2010.  
18
  Sibanda & Zantwijk S11D: R&D Tax Incentive – Discussion Document (2007) 6. 
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2.1. Introduction 
As mentioned above the R&D incentive allowance is extremely technical in nature.  
With R&D being a specialist field, section 11D (i.e. the R&D incentive allowance) is 
plagued with terms typically found in IP legislation.  A thorough grasp of IP law is 
however not within the aptitude of most taxpayers.  Thus, in the absence of any 
provisions defining these technical terms, the interpretation of section 11D 
represents a conundrum to most taxpayers.  
The discovery of novel, practical and non-obvious information is listed as one of the 
qualifying R&D activities for purposes of section 11D of the Income Tax Act.  
“Novelty” and “non-obviousness” are principles which lay at the heart of Patent law.  
It is therefore extremely technical in nature and difficult to construe without proper 
guidance.  Section 11D however contains no definition provisions in this regard. This 
study aims to provide meaning to these terms within the bounds of the trite rules of 
interpretation which have governed tax laws over the years. 
2.2. Rules of interpretation governing this study 
In Mincer Motors Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and Excise,19 the court held that 
words, of which no definitions are given in the particular act itself, or the relevant 
interpretation act, must be given their ordinary dictionary meaning, unless a contrary 
intention appears.20 
Furthermore, Wessels CJ held in CIR v Delfos21 that: 
“I do not understand this to mean that in no case in a taxing Act are we to give to a 
section a narrower or wider meaning than its apparent meaning, for in all cases of 
interpretation we must take the whole statute into consideration and so arrive at the true 
intention of the legislature.” 
The phrase “intention of the legislature” has received strenuous academic criticism 
for being inter alia a fictitious concept.22  However, it appears as though to give 
                                                 
19
  1958 (1) SA 652 (T). 
20
  Clegg & Stretch  Income Tax in South Africa (2007) 2.6. 
21
  1933 AD 242 6 (SATC) 92. 
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meaning to a provision of a statute in Britain and South Africa today, is to determine 
the intention of the legislature.23 Du Plessis states: 
“Generally speaking the South African Courts seem to have accepted; almost as a slogan 
the basic thesis underlying the intention theory, and have applied this sloganised theory 
with little, if any, sensitivity to its numerous pitfalls.  To list all South African precedents in 
which this approach has been used, recognised or referred to, would require a rather 
extensive table of cases.  In almost every case in which the interpretation of an 
enactment is at stake, a dictum to the effect that the prime task of the Court is to 
endeavour to determine the true intention of the Legislature, appears.”24  
In his address at the NCD celebration, Ogilvie Thompson CJ, referring to the 
intention of the legislature said: 
“When the problem with which a judge is seized turns upon the construction of some 
statutory provision, it is essential for him to determine the intention of the legislature as 
expressed in the particular statute under consideration . . . Once a judge has determined 
what he conceives to be the intention of the legislature he must perforce give effect to the 
intention so determined.”25 
It is therefore submitted that in the absence of any provisions defining the terms at 
issue, an enquiry into the true intention of the legislature must be launched before 
the ordinary dictionary meaning is to be attributed to the words “novel” and “non-
obvious”. 
2.3. Determining legislative intent 
In discussing Heydon’s case26, Lord Coke described how a court was to arrive at the 
real meaning of a provision in a statute:  
                                                                                                                                                        
22
  Kellaway  Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.37. 
23
   Kellaway  Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.37. 
24
  Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.37, in referring to 
the dictum of Du Plessis found in The Interpretation of Statutes 35. 
25
  Kellaway  Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.37, in referring to 
the address delivered by Ogilvie Thompson CJ at the NCD celebration as quoted in the SALJ1972 
31. 
26
  [1584] EWHC Exch J36, 76 ER 637, Pasch 26 Eliz. 
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“We are to see what was the law before the Act was passed, and what was the mischief 
or defect for which the law had not provided, what remedy Parliament appointed and the 
reason for the remedy”.27 
Lord Coke’s principle has been followed in South Africa and confirmed as a principle 
of construction in the cases of Olley v Maasdrop28 and Dys v Dys.29 30 
Furthermore, in the Sussex Peerage31 case it was said in the House of Lords:  
 “If any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been a 
safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making the 
Statute.” 
This principle was expressly followed in South Africa in the case of Hleka v 
Johannesburg City Council.32 33  
Legislative intent can therefore be ascertained by having regard to the ground and 
cause of making the statute.  The purpose of an enactment can be found in the 
Explanatory Memorandum issued by National Treasury on the relevant Revenue 
Laws Amendment Bill proposing the enactment.  Regard can also be had to the 
relevant circumstances (i.e. political, economical etcetera) surrounding the proposed 
enactment to shed further light on the intent of the legislature.34 
Below, a study of the Explanatory Memorandum issued on the proposed enactment 
of section 11D will be made in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature. 
                                                 
27
   Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.37.2, in referring 
to Lord Edward Coke’s discussion of the Heydon case as found in his report, 2 Coke’s Reports 18 
Part III 7(b). 
28
  1948 4 SA 657 (A) 666. 
29
  1979 3 SA 1170 (O) 1179. 
30
  Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.37.2. 
31
  8 All ER 1057 1059; (1844) 11 CI & F 14 85. 
32
  1949 1 SA 842 (A) 852. 
33
  Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.37.2.1. 
34
  Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.36. 
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2.4. The intention with the enactment of section 11D 
Prior to the enactment of section 11D, section 11B of the Income Tax Act dealt with 
deductions for R&D expenditure.  It allowed for a deduction of 100 per cent for R&D 
expenditure undertaken by a taxpayer.  In terms of capital expenditure, a 
depreciation allowance35 existed for the cost of any qualifying asset used for the 
purpose of R&D.   
In 2006 section 11D was introduced and effectively replaced section 11B as the R&D 
incentive section.  The rate at which operating expenditure could be deducted was 
increased from 100 per cent to 150 per cent with an accelerated capital depreciation 
allowance36 for qualifying assets used for the purpose of R&D.  However, the type of 
expenditure qualifying for the 150 per cent allowance was restricted for purposes of 
section 11D.  In order for expenditure to fall within this enhanced regime (i.e. section 
11D), it is required that the R&D activities must be of a scientific or technological 
nature.37  Registration expenses incurred in obtaining or renewing intellectual 
property will not fall within the ambit of section 11D as it did with the replaced section 
11B.  Furthermore, costs expended on the discovery of novel, practical and non-
obvious information was brought into the ambit of the 150 per cent incentive 
allowance under the new regime.  It is clear from these changes that the legislature 
intended to encourage the advancement of scientific and technological knowledge as 
opposed to routine learning associated with ongoing processes. 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum38 issued by National Treasury on the 
enactment of section 11D, the reasons for the change were: 
“Innovation, research and technological development are key factors for improved 
productivity (leading to new or improved products, processes or services).  This 
enhanced productivity in turn leads to increased economic growth and international 
                                                 
35
  The cost of the asset was to be claimed as a deduction over a 4 year period, i.e. 40 per cent in the 
first year and 20 per cent in the subsequent three years. 
36
  The cost of the asset is to be claimed as a deduction over a 3 year period, i.e. 50 per cent in the 
first year, 30 per cent in the following year and 20 per cent in the last year. 
37
  Section 11B of the Income Tax Act did not require R&D activities to be of a scientific or 
technological nature in order to fall within the ambit of section 11B.  This is a new requirement set 
by section 11D of the Income Tax Act.  
38
  National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2006. 
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competitiveness.  However, R&D is costly, involving high levels of technical risk.  Given 
the high entry costs (and the indirect positive externalities for countries as whole), 
Governments sometimes provide extra support for local R&D via direct subsidiaries as 
well as through tax incentives (i.e. which operate as indirect subsidies). While South 
Africa offers a variety of direct subsidies for R&D, the South African tax regime for R&D 
does not provide substantial incentives.39  South Africa accordingly needs an improved 
set of R&D tax incentives to ensure that local R&D is not at a global competitive 
disadvantage.”40 
From the above it is clear that the intention of the legislature with the enactment of 
section 11D was to incentivise and stimulate R&D activity in South Africa.  With 
incentive sections, the tendency is to award such a section a more liberal 
construction than with a restrictive section.  
However, with section 11D the legislature’s aim was to incentivise a very specific 
type of R&D activity.  This can be adduced from the additional requirements set by 
section 11D in contrast to section 11B.41  If a taxpayer would fall into the ambit of 
section 11D by conducting mere routine learning activities as part of ongoing 
processes, the taxpayer would rather opt for such low-risk activities than attempting 
high-risk R&D activities requiring a great amount of skill and costs.  As mentioned in 
the opening chapter, the ultimate goal of increased R&D activity in South Africa is 
the achievement of sustained growth over the long term in order to address poverty 
and the high levels of unemployment.  However, if only low-risk routine learning 
activities are conducted, major advances in the field of science and technology will 
not follow and as a result, unemployment and poverty levels will remain unaffected.    
It is therefore submitted that a more restrictive approach towards the construction of 
section 11D is to be followed in order to ensure that the intention of the legislature is 
given effect to. 
                                                 
39
  Emphasis added. 
40
  National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2006 7-8 
41
  A good example as illustration hereof is that section 11B listed as a qualifying R&D activity the 
“discovery of new information” whereas section 11D requires the information discovered to be 
“novel, practical and non-obvious”.   It is clear that section 11D is more restrictive in its approach 
than the replaced section 11B. 
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2.5. The approach to construing the terms “novel” and “non-obvious”  
As mentioned above, the “discovery of novel, practical and non-obvious information 
of a scientific or technical nature” is one of the qualifying R&D activities for purposes 
of section 11D.  The construction of the words “novel” and “non-obvious” forms the 
object of chapters 3 to 5. 
In general, when construing the words used in a statute, one should have regard to 
the provision as a whole.42  It is submitted that in construing the meaning of the 
words “novel” and “non-obvious” information, regard should be had to the other four 
qualifying R&D activities in order to shed some light on the nature of the R&D Activity 
being studied.   
In terms of section 11D(1) of the Income Tax Act, the following activities constitute 
qualifying R&D activities: 
- (a) the discovery of novel, practical and non obvious information; or 
- (b) the devising, developing or creation of any- 
o invention as defined in section 2 of the Patents Act No 57 of 1978 
o design as defined in section 1 of the Designs Act No 195 of 1993 that 
qualifies for registration under section 14 of the said Act; 
o computer program as defined in section 1 of the Copyright Act No 98 of 
1978; or 
o knowledge essential to the use of such invention, design or computer 
program,  
provided that the above is of a scientific or technological nature. 
It is submitted by attorneys Sibanda & Zantwijk (consultants to Treasury on this 
section) that one of the motivations for the insertion of section 11D(1)(a)43 is the fact 
that section 25(2)(a) of our Patents Act denies “discoveries” the status of an 
                                                 
42
  Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 3.36. 
43
  i.e. the discovery of novel, practical and non-obvious information. 
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invention.  A discovery, therefore, does not enjoy the benefit of patent protection and 
will, as a result, not fall within the ambit of section 11D(1)(b) which allows a tax 
incentive for the devising, developing or creation of a patentable invention.  Thus, 
without section 11D(1)(a) the discovery of information will not enjoy any tax 
incentive.   It is clear, from the insertion of section 11D(1)(a) that Treasury wanted to 
incentivise “discoveries” in addition to “patentable inventions”.   
By referring to “an invention as defined in section 2 of the Patents Act”, the 
legislature effectively adopts the criteria for a patentable invention (set by the 
Patents Act) as criteria for purposes of section 11D.  The Patents Act requires an 
invention to be new, practical and involve an inventive step44 in order to qualify for 
patent protection.  This presents the same criteria as is set by section 11D(1)(a) for 
the discovery of information. 
Whereas inventions are governed by the Patents Act, discoveries are not regulated, 
as they are specifically excluded from the ambit of the Patents Act.  However, the 
legislature effectively ignored this exclusion made by the Patents Act by inserting 
section 11D(1)(a) into the Income Tax Act.  As mentioned above, section 11D(1)(a) 
lists the same requirements (i.e. novel, practical, non-obvious) for the information 
discovered as those set by the Patents Act for a patentable invention.  
For this reason, it is submitted that the words “novel” and “non-obvious” should be 
given the meaning attributed to them in terms of the Patents Act and relevant IP 
jurisprudence.  The stare decisis principle serves as authority for this view.  It 
determines that a decision of a court is authoritative and binding on the court that 
gave that decision as well as all courts subordinate to that court and must be 
followed in subsequent cases in which the facts are similar.  The scope and meaning 
placed on the concepts of “new”, “novel” and “non-obvious” by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal is thus binding on that court as well as any other court subordinate to that 
court (this includes the Tax Court and High Court). 
                                                 
44
  It will be seen in Chapter 4 that an invention is deemed to involve an inventive step if it is not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art.  Therefore, the requirement of an inventive step is the same 
as the requirement that information must be non-obvious in nature. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
It is trite law that in construing any provision of a statute, the intention of the 
legislature should be sought and given effect to before the ordinary meaning is 
awarded thereto.  
From the Explanatory Memorandum issued on the proposed enactment of Section 
11D it is apparent that the intention of the legislature was to stimulate R&D activities 
of a scientific and technological nature which will result in new knowledge and not 
merely represent routine learning activities as part of ongoing processes.  The 
ultimate goal sought by Treasury is to create long-term growth opportunities in order 
to address poverty and high levels of unemployment in South Africa.  It is therefore 
submitted that a more restricted approach be followed in the construction of the R&D 
activity being studied, i.e. the discovery of novel, practical and non-obvious 
information.   
It is submitted by attorneys Sibanda & Zantwijk (consultants to Treasury on this 
section) that one of the motivations for the insertion of section 11D(1)(a)45 was the 
fact that section 25(2)(a) of our Patents Act denies “discoveries” the status of an 
invention.  The legislature effectively ignored this exclusion with the insertion of 
section 11D(1)(a).  It is submitted that the intention of the legislature was to award 
discoveries the opportunity to qualify for the R&D tax incentive allowance. 
Discoveries are not regularised and seeing as the requirements set for discoveries 
by the R&D tax incentive section reflects the patent requirements set for inventions 
by the Patents Act, it is submitted that the words “novel” and “non-obvious” should 
be given the meaning awarded to it in terms of the Patents Act and relevant IP 
jurisprudence.  The relevant IP rulings will be binding on the tax court in terms of the 
stare decisis rule.46 
In Chapters 3 and 4 the meaning of the words “novel” and “non-obvious” respectively 
will be studied against the background of the Patents Act and relevant IP 
                                                 
45
  i.e. the discovery of novel, practical and non-obvious information. 
46
  The stare decisis rule determines that a decision of a court is authoritative and binding on the court 
that gave that decision as well as all courts subordinate to that court and must be followed in 
subsequent cases in which the facts are similar.   
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jurisprudence.  In Chapter 5, the difference between an ‘invention’ and a ‘discovery’47 
will be studied as well as the effect that any difference has on the construction of the 
words “novel” and “non-obvious” for tax purposes.  Furthermore, the ordinary 
meaning of “novel” and “non-obvious” will be compared with the meaning awarded to 
it in terms of the Patents Act and relevant IP jurisprudence. Chapter 5 will conclude 
by placing a final construction on the words “novel” and “non-obvious” for purposes 
of the R&D tax incentive section.  
As mentioned above, the intention of the legislature with the enactment of section 
11D was to incentivise a specific type of R&D activity.  Chapter 5 will attempt to give 
effect to this intention by following a restrictive approach to construction.   
  
 
                                                 
47
  The terms “novel” and “non-obvious” were construed by IP jurisprudence as applied to ‘inventions’.  
However, the R&D incentive section refers to the ‘discovery’ of new and non-obvious information.  
An invention results in the creation of something new, whereas a discovery presupposes an 
existing asset.  Thus, the “novelty” requirement as applied to inventions may be more stringent in 
nature than the “new” requirement as applied to the discovery of information for purposes of the 
R&D tax incentive.  Chapter 5 will study the effect of this difference in detail.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 
 
CHAPTER 3 
“Novelty” in terms of IP jurisprudence 
 
 
3.1. The Law of Patents and the “novelty” requirement 19 
3.2. Statutory definition of “new” in terms of the Patents Act 20 
3.3. “New” as laid out by IP jurisprudence and EPO Guidelines 21 
3.3.1. Made available to the public 21 
3.3.1.1. EPO Guidelines 21 
3.3.1.2. IP Jurisprudence 22 
3.3.2. Written or oral description 23 
3.3.2.1. IP Jurisprudence 23 
3.4. Conclusion 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
3.1. The Law of Patents and the “novelty” requirement 
In order for a taxpayer to fall within the ambit of section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax 
Act, the taxpayer must have expended costs on the discovery of novel, practical and 
non-obvious information.  As mentioned above, the Income Tax Act does not contain 
a definition to convey the meaning of so-called novel information.  The Income Tax 
Act however contains several references to the Patents Act.  This reference to the 
Patents Act warrants an investigation into the said act in order to find a possible 
construction to be placed on “novel” information.   
Novelty lies at the heart of IP Law. This is due to the requirement that an invention 
must be new48 in order to qualify for patentability.  The Patents Act continues to 
define a “new invention” by stating that an invention will be regarded as new if it does 
not form part of the state of the art immediately before the priority date of that 
invention.49  The said Act therefore provides clarity on the meaning of a “new” 
invention by containing a statutory definition of the concept. 
The question however arises whether this definition and the corresponding 
jurisprudence thereon can be consulted as aid in the present inquiry.  The Patents 
Act refers to the word “new” whereas section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act refers 
to the word “novel”.   
However, the Afrikaans text of the Income Tax Act uses the word “nuwe”. According 
to the Pharos Bilingual School Dictionary50 the word “nuwe” means “new” in English, 
which is also the word referred to by the Patents Act.  Furthermore, the word “novel” 
originates from the Latin word “novus” which means “new”.51  It is submitted that the 
above provides enough proof that the meaning of the word “new” as defined by the 
Patents Act, can bear the same meaning to the word “novel” as used by the Income 
Tax Act.  This view is further supported by the absence of a statutory definition for 
“novel” in the Income Tax Act and the subsequent references to the Patents Act in 
the relevant section.   
                                                 
48
  Section 25(1) of the Patents Act. 
49
  Section 25(5) of the Patents Act. 
50
  Pharos Bilingual School Dictionary (2007) 169. 
51
  Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010:1215.   
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3.2. Statutory definition of “new” in terms of the Patents Act 
The Patents Act deems an invention to be “new” if it does not form part of the state 
of the art immediately before the priority date.52  The state of the art comprises all 
matter (whether a product, process, information about either, or anything else) which 
has been made available to the public (whether in the Republic or elsewhere) by 
written or oral description, by use or in any other way.53   The priority date of an 
invention is generally the date on which the patent application was lodged with the 
registrar.54   
From the above it is clear that South Africa enforces an absolute novelty requirement 
for IP purposes.  There is no limitation regarding the locality of the prior disclosure, 
nor is there any limitation as to its form or age.55  Certain features of this definition of 
“new” will be scrutinized below in an attempt to elucidate the ambit thereof.  South 
African IP jurisprudence on the matter will be called upon.  Seeing as the definition of 
“patentable inventions”56 is in keeping with modern trends in international 
development of patent law57 as expressed, for instance, in the European Patent 
Convention 1973, as well as the patent legislation of countries belonging to that 
convention,58 reference will also be made to the Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office (“EPO”) as published by that office59 as part of the above 
mentioned study.  
                                                 
52
  See section 25(5) of the Patents Act. 
53
  See section 25(6) of the Patents Act. 
54
  In lieu of the fact that the present inquiry relates to the discovery of novel information for purposes 
of the R&D tax incentive deduction, the priority date of an invention for IP purposes does not bear 
significant relevance to this study.  Therefore, a detailed investigation into the priority date of an 
invention will not be launched.  For purposes of this study, the priority date will be the date on 
which the discovery of novel information for R&D purposes was made.  The relevant criteria to be 
discussed as part of this chapter are to be considered by the taxpayer on this date (i.e. date the 
discovery was made). 
55
  Steyn The Law of South Africa (2010). 
56
  See section 25 of the Patents Act. 
57
  Steyn Annual Survey (1978) 479 as cited in Steyn The Law of South Africa (2010). 
58
  Steyn The Law of South Africa (2010). 
59
  Hereinafter referred to as the EPO Guidelines. 
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3.3. “New” as laid out by IP jurisprudence and EPO Guidelines 
As mentioned above, an invention is deemed to be new if it did not form part of any 
matter made available to the public in any form prior to the invention thereof.  
Jurisprudence on the matter revolves around two considerations, namely: 
- When is matter considered to be made available to the public? 
- When is a prior publication considered to have “described” the invention in 
suit? 
In considering the above mentioned features of the definition of “new”, our courts 
have laid down certain principles as guidelines for considering novelty.  These 
principles will enjoy closer scrutiny below. 
3.3.1. Made available to the public 
3.3.1.1. EPO Guidelines 
According to the European Patent Office’s Guidelines for Examination60  a written 
description should be regarded as “made available to the public” if, at the relevant 
date, it was possible for members of the public to gain knowledge of the content of 
the document and there was no bar of confidentiality restricting the use or 
dissemination of such knowledge.  Thus, material that is kept secret, whether 
voluntarily or by reason of some imposed restraint, does not form part of the state of 
the art.  If, however, an invention is used secretly and on a commercial scale within 
the Republic, the Patents Act deems such an invention to form part of the state of 
the art.   
As mentioned above, no limitation is placed on the form of the prior disclosure.  The 
EPO Guidelines elucidate the fact that non-traditional publications also constitute 
prior art.  Such publications are usually found on the internet, via, for example, 
Usenet discussion groups, blogs, e-mail archives of mailing lists or wiki pages.61  It is 
                                                 
60
  European Patent Office Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (2010) Part C, 
Chapter IV-17, paragraph 6.1. 
61
  European Patent Office Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (2010) Part C, 
Chapter IV-21, paragraph 6.2.3.3. 
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submitted that the credibility of such publications is irrelevant in considering whether 
these publications form part of the state of the art. 
3.3.1.2. IP Jurisprudence 
Jurisprudence on the matter is limited.  This can be ascribed to the fact that the 
provision is unambiguous and wide in its ambit. However, the court was faced with 
an interesting set of facts in Veasy v Denver Rock Drill and Machinery Co Ltd.62  At 
the time, the drilling machines used by miners of the Rand Mine released 
microscopic particles of dust into the air which resulted in the miners attracting 
miners’ phthisis.  Experiments were undertaken to produce a drilling machine which 
could be operated by the miners without any exposure to the dust particles.  The 
case revolved around the question whether a device which was experimented with, 
put into use and then later discontinued, formed part of the state of the art at that 
time.  J.A. Wessels held: 
“We must distinguish between the case where an inventor experiments with a machine or 
device and keeps his knowledge to himself, - and the case where a person openly uses a 
machine or device which is identical with a later patented machine, or device and which 
effects the same purpose as a later patent but for any reason the use of the machine or 
device is discontinued.  In the latter case the machine or device goes beyond the 
experimental stage and becomes a completed contrivance.  It is then the completed 
contrivance which is abandoned and not the experiment.  Flynn, Edmondson and 
Mynhardt had no object in keeping the device secret.  Flynn was not experimenting with a 
view to taking out a patent.  He wanted a device to release the air, quite openly, so that 
any mechanic who made or examined the machines had the opportunity of adopting the 
device.  No evidence is needed to prove that the device was actually seen by the mine 
mechanics, though it is clear that both Edmondson and Mynhart knew about it.”63  
The machines put into use did achieve the result sought after, i.e. to eliminate the 
release of dust particles.  The machines were however considered unsatisfactory 
because they atomized the water and so produced a fog.  The miners were prepared 
to run the risk of miners’ phthisis rather than cope with excessive water.  On this 
ground the machines were discontinued.  The appellant argued that due to the fact 
that the machines were discontinued, it should be viewed as a failed experiment and 
                                                 
62
  1930 AD 243.  
63
  Veasy v Denver Rock Drill & Machinery Co Ltd 1930 AD 243 at page 263. 
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therefore did not form part of the state of the art.  The court however disagreed and 
laid down the following principle in this regard: 
“….an experiment which never becomes completed but up to the last remains an 
experiment and nothing more does not as a rule anticipate a novel machine, device or 
process.  When, however, the experimental stage is over, and the machine or device 
operates effectively for the purpose for which it was designed, and it is used by persons 
capable of understanding its use, then we are no longer dealing with an experiment but 
with a completed invention and with a completed publication.  It is quite true that if the 
person who makes the experiment throws the machine aside and discontinues his work 
upon it, the presumption is that he found it useless to effect the object for which it was 
designed; but this is only a presumption.  If he did effect the object for which it was 
designed and it is shown that for other reasons work with it was discontinued, it is a good 
anticipation, however long ago it may have been used.  It is not necessary for one who 
pleads anticipation to prove that the machine or device which negatives novelty of the 
patent was in continuous use.”64 
It is therefore submitted that if the object for which an experiment was conducted, is 
achieved, the experiment forms part of the state of the art irrespective of whether the 
results of the experiment were put into use, provided that the public have access to 
these results.   
3.3.2. Written or oral description 
3.3.2.1. IP Jurisprudence 
According to Trollip J.A. in Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd65 the question 
whether a claim has novelty over what is disclosed in an earlier document is 
primarily one of construction of the two documents.66  The two documents are to be 
compared to ascertain whether the prior patent was granted for, or the prior printed 
publication “describes”, the same process, etc, as claimed.67 Trollip J.A. then 
continues to place the following construction on “describe”:   
                                                 
64
  Veasy v Denver Rock Drill & Machinery Co Ltd 1930 AD 243 at page 263. 
65
  [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A).  
66
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 252. 
67
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A) 252. 
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“Hence for it to “describe” the invented process etc., it must set forth or recite at least its 
essential integers in such a way that the same or substantially the same process is 
identifiable or perceptible and hence made known, or the same or substantially the same 
thing can be made, from that description.  “Substantially the same”, means practically the 
same, or, to use Lord Westbury’s phrase adopted by Wessels, J.A., in Veasy’s case, 
p.269, the same “for the purposes of practical utility”; i.e., substance and not form must 
be regarded.”68     
If found, on comparison of the two documents, that the prior publication fails to recite 
a single integer, the prior publication cannot be said to describe the invention 
claimed.  This will typically be the case if the same thing cannot be made from the 
description in the prior publication.  Trollip, J.A. held: 
“….if the description in the prior publication differs, even in a small respect, provided it is 
a real difference, such as the non-recital of a single essential integer, the objection of 
anticipation fails.”69 
In the Gentiruco case the court considered whether a difference in purpose between 
the process of the prior art and that of the patent in suit constituted a real difference.  
The process of the patent in suit included an instruction to include a large quantity of 
Naftolen in order to maintain or improve the quality of the compound.  The prior 
publication claimed to be anticipatory also included the use of Naftolen but for the 
purpose of improved process ability of the compound.  The purpose of the prior 
publication therefore differed appreciably from that of the claim.  The appellant 
argued that the difference in purpose between two processes was irrelevant. Trollip, 
J.A. however found that the difference in purpose emphasized an essential 
difference between the processes. In referring to the argument of the appellant, he 
made the following comment: 
“That argument is, I think, probably correct where two processes are otherwise the same 
or substantially the same, since such processes could conceivably serve different 
purposes.  But usually processes devised for different purposes are themselves different 
in one or more essential integers, and difference in purpose might well be a good 
                                                 
68
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 252. 
69
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 252. 
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indication that the processes do differ or that, if the difference is small, it is real or 
crucial.”70 
As regards to the manner in which the prior publication is to be read and construed, 
the appellate division held: 
“…it is the function of the Court, applying in general the ordinary canons of construction, 
to determine what the document says, viz. the instructions to the ordinary skilled 
workman.  But I am, in any event, not persuaded that the hypothetical workman himself 
would read the document differently.  At the very least average ability to read and 
understand simple language relating to his trade must be postulated, and it may fairly be 
assumed that the workman, in order to qualify himself to make the articles mentioned in 
the publication, would scrutinize the document carefully through the lens of his desire and 
practical need to extract every bit of information.  He would certainly not skip any 
passage; he would read through the whole document to gain that information, repeatedly 
if necessary.” 
Furthermore, the prior publication is to be construed as at the date of its publication 
to the exclusion of information subsequently discovered.71  Regard is however to be 
had to what constituted common knowledge as at the date of publication. 
In order to constitute anticipation, the prior publication must be contained in a single 
publication, unless such a publication comprises several parts which are separately 
published provided that they are so interrelated or integrated that they in fact form 
one single publication which is to be read as a whole.72  The so-called “mosaic” or 
“patchwork approach” is not sanctioned by our courts.  Holmes, J.A., puts it as 
follows in Letraset Ltd v Helios Ltd73  
“One should not be required assiduously to glean ideas here and there in the prior 
publication, and then with the aid of hindsight piece them together into a mosaic said to 
describe the invention under challenge.  …Now the respondent pieces together these 
disparate ideas mosaically, and lo, it claims to have found therein description of the 
invention under challenge.  This patchwork approach is not sanctioned by any decision 
which I have been able to find…” 
                                                 
70
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 258. 
71
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 252. 
72
  Steyn The Law of South Africa (2010). 
73
  [1972] 3 All SA 191 (A). 
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3.4. Conclusion 
From the above, it is concluded that an invention is regarded as novel if it did not 
form part of the state of the art immediately before the date of its invention.  The 
state of the art comprises all matter which has been made available to the public by 
written or oral description, by use or in any other way.   
Prior art is regarded as being available to the public if it is possible for members of 
the public to gain knowledge of the content of the prior art and there was no bar of 
confidentiality restricting the use or dissemination of such knowledge.  Only 
experiments of which the object for which it was conducted, were achieved, form part 
of the state of the art irrespective of whether the results of the experiment were put in 
to use or not.   
Prior art will describe the invention under challenge if it sets forth in words or recites 
the essential integers of the information in such a way that the same or substantially 
the same invention is identifiable or perceptible and hence made known, or the same 
or substantially the same thing can be made, from that description.  “Substantially 
the same” means practically the same, or the same for the purposes of practical 
utility.  If the prior publication fails to recite a single integer, the prior publication 
cannot be said to describe the invention claimed to be novel. 
The prior publication is to be contained in a single publication74 and should be 
construed on the date of its publication to the exclusion of information subsequently 
discovered.  One should not be required to search for scattered ideas in the prior art, 
and then with the aid of hindsight piece them together into a mosaic said to describe 
the invention under challenge.  Such a “mosaic” approach is not sanctioned by our 
courts. 
If, on comparison, it is found that the prior art describes the invention under 
challenge, the invention cannot be said to be “new” for purposes of patentability.  
                                                 
74
  A publication comprising several parts which are separately published will also be regarded as a 
single publication provided that they are so interrelated or integrated that they in fact form one 
single publication which is to be read as a whole. 
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However, if the comparison shows that there is a real difference between the prior 
art and the invention under challenge, the invention will have passed the first 
requirement for patentability, i.e. the novelty requirement. 
The second requirement set for both patentability and the R&D incentive allowance 
is that the invention/information must be non-obvious.  An invention can be obvious 
despite the fact that it is considered to be new.  In the next chapter the “non-obvious” 
requirement will enjoy closer scrutiny.  
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4.1. Introduction 
In addition to being “new”, the Patents Act also requires an invention to involve an 
inventive step in order to qualify for patent protection.75  The Patents Act deems an 
invention to involve an inventive step if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, 
having regard to any matter which forms, immediately before the priority date of the 
invention, part of the state of the art.76  The concepts of “novelty” and “inventiveness” 
are distinctly different requirements in terms of IP law.  However, the line dividing the 
two concepts has often become obscured in the past and as a result has eluded 
many a judge and IP scholar.  Wessels, J.A. made it clear that such a distinction is of 
vital importance and should be enforced by our courts:  
“But it has sometimes been said that the distinction between the two is at times obscure 
and cannot always be maintained.  For example Fletcher-Mouton has the following in his 
work on Patent Law and Practice (page 21):- 
“It will readily be seen that the distinction is often one without any real difference.  In 
nearly every case the exact thing patented has never been proposed before, and the 
dispute is usually as to the extent of the advance made on previous knowledge.  In 
such case the question, is the alleged invention new, might be said to be solved by 
the Court determining what advance on previous knowledge would be necessary in 
that case to constitute an invention and then deciding if such advance had in fact 
been made, while the question of subject-matter would be decided by first 
determining what advance had been made and then considering whether such 
advance were sufficient to constitute invention.” 
…With great respect to these learned authors, I think that the distinction is both valuable 
and clear and should not be obscured.”77 
The sentiment of Wessels, J.A. was shared by Trollip, J.A. in the Gentiruco case: 
“The objections of lack of inventiveness and novelty are closely linked.  Indeed, up to 
some stage in the past they were often considered together and the distinction between 
them was seldom clearly drawn.  How closely linked they are is apparent from the fact 
that even now a test more appropriate for determining inventiveness is sometimes 
                                                 
75
  Section 25(1). 
76
  Section 25(10). 
77
  Veasy v Denver Rock Drill and Machinery Co Ltd 1930 AD 243 at page 281. 
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adopted in deciding  novelty.  But an invention might be obvious without being old, or old 
without being obvious,78 and with respect I agree with the dictum of STRATFORD, J.A. 
(as he then was) … that the distinction between the two objections is ‘both valuable and 
clear and should not be obscured’.”79 
 The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the line which separates the novelty 
requirement from the inventiveness requirement by analysing the meaning of “non-
obviousness” as laid out by our courts and comparing it to the novelty requirement. 
4.2. Non-obvious requirement 
As mentioned above the Patents Act requires an invention to involve an inventive 
step in order to qualify for patent protection.80  The said Act further deems an 
invention to involve an inventive step if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the 
art.81 
The same theme of “obviousness” is reiterated in section 11D(1) of the Income Tax 
Act where information is required to be, amongst others, non-obvious in order for the 
taxpayer to qualify for the R&D incentive allowance. 
Seeing as the Income Tax Act contains no definition on what constitutes “non-
obvious” information, the meaning and scope of the requirement will be sought in IP 
jurisprudence. 
Below, the manner in which our courts determine obviousness, will be studied and 
discussed in full against the backdrop of the corresponding R&D tax incentive 
allowance requirement. 
4.3. Determination of obviousness 
The determination of obviousness has been reformulated by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in a series of decisions beginning with Ensign Brickford (SA) (Pty) Ltd v AECI 
Explosives & Chemicals Ltd82.  Plewman JA overturned and revised many 
                                                 
78
  Emphasis added. 
79
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972] 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 251. 
80
  Section 25(1). 
81
  Section 25(10). 
82
  [1998] 4 All SA 453 (A). 
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established principles relating to the law of ‘obviousness’ and particularly to the way 
in which this is tested in South African law.83  It was the first documented case in 
which a court found a patented invention to be ‘obvious’ under the current Patents 
Act.84  It has been notoriously difficult to revoke a patent on this ground in the past.85  
The way in which the Supreme Court of Appeal did so in this case sets new 
precedents. Therefore the judgement in this case warrants closer scrutiny. 
4.3.1. The four-step inquiry (Ensign Brickford)  
The long established three-step inquiry which was utilised by our courts in order to 
determine whether an invention was obvious was cast aside by Plewman, J.A. in the 
Ensign Brickford case.  Plewman, J.A. held that the said inquiry must proceed further 
and that a more structured inquiry must be undertaken.  He accordingly introduced 
into our law the following four-step inquiry: 
(1) What is the inventive step said to be involved in the patent in suit? 
(2) What was, at the priority date, the state of the art relevant to the step? 
(3) In what respect does the step go beyond, or differ from, the state of the 
art? 
(4) Having regard to such development or difference, would the taking of the 
step be obvious to the skilled man?86 
In reviewing the effect of the judgement in the Ensign Brickford case, patent 
attorney, Piers Blewett had the following comments: 
“Rather than reviewing the relevant prior art as a first step in order to establish whether 
the invention claimed has a ‘step forward’ which could be said to be ‘inventive’ (or ‘non-
obvious’), a patentee is now required to pin his colours to the mast up front and lead 
evidence relevant to the (new) first question, and identify the inventive step said to be 
involved in the patent in suit.  The prior art is then reviewed subsequently to see whether 
that alleged ‘step’ can be identified in the prior art, or is different.  In this way, Plewman 
JA appears to have turned the inquiry around. 
                                                 
83
  Blewett Patent “Obviousness” and Related Matters (1998). 
84
  Blewett Patent “Obviousness” and Related Matters (1998). 
85
  Blewett Patent “Obviousness” and Related Matters (1998). 
86
  Ensign Brickford (SA) (Pty) Ltd and others v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd [1998] 4 All SA 
453 (A) at page 461. 
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The consequences of applying this new test were certainly felt by the patentee because it 
was in relation to the first (new) inquiry that the Judge of Appeal felt that the patentee’s 
evidence was lacking.  The Judge called this evidence ‘primary’ evidence and at 811 
stated that: 
‘...very limited attention seems to have been paid to it in the evidence.  The result is 
that the primary evidence is not particularly helpful’. 
But is this apparent lack of evidence filed on behalf of the patentee to show 
‘inventiveness’ a valid criticism when it has traditionally been incumbent on the defendant 
to lead evidence in support of ‘obviousness’?  It has long been an established principle of 
our South African patent law that a patent is presumed valid until shown otherwise.  The 
onus is on the defendant who argues invalidity of the patent to show such invalidity on 
any of the grounds it chooses to attempt to revoke the patent.  By focussing on what the 
patentee has to say, and by asking the patentee to lead evidence relevant to (the new) 
question one, it could perhaps be argued that some shifting of the onus has occurred.  At 
the very least, the burden of evidence on the patentee to rebut a prima facie case of 
obviousness appears to have increased.”  
It is submitted by Mr Blewett that the Ensign Brickford case led to a shifting of the 
burden of proof onto the shoulders of the patentee or at least has led to an increased 
burden of proof in this instance. 
In terms of section 82 of the Income Tax Act the burden of proof that any amount is 
subject to any deduction shall be upon the person claiming such deduction.  
Therefore, if a taxpayer claims an amount expended on the discovery of novel, non-
obvious and practical information the onus shall be on the taxpayer to show that the 
information discovered satisfies the criteria set out by section 11D(1).  The onus is 
therefore on the taxpayer to show that the information is non-obvious.  The taxpayer 
appears to be in a similar position as the patentee in regards to the burden of proof 
relating to inventiveness.  For this reason the four-step inquiry, as established in the 
Ensign Brickford, case enjoys even greater relevance seeing as in both cases (IP 
law and tax law) the inventor/taxpayer carries the burden of proof in regards to 
showing inventiveness. 
Jurisprudence following the Ensign Brickford judgement has since then elaborated 
on the steps of the four-step-inquiry.  The guidance provided by these judgements 
will be studied below especially in regards to: 
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- What comprises the state of the art when considering obviousness (step 2),87  
- What considerations are made when evaluating obviousness (step 4),88 and 
- What entails a “person skilled in the art (step 4)”.89 
The above considerations pertain to steps 2 and 4 of the 4 step inquiry.  It is 
submitted that steps 1 and 3 are subjective and are unique to every case being 
considered.  Steps 2 and 4 however are objective, of an academic nature, and form 
the central inquiry to every claim being considered.   
Below follows a detailed study of steps 2 and 4. 
4.3.2. What comprises the state of the art (step 2)  
The state of the art is the same as that against which the novelty of an invention is 
assessed, i.e. all matter which has been made available to the public by written or 
oral description, by use or in any other way.  The only notable distinction between 
the two is that the mosaic rule finds no application when assessing inventiveness.  In 
other words the doctrine that one cannot establish anticipation by making a “mosaic” 
of prior publications is not applicable to obviousness.  The prior art as a whole must 
be considered when assessing inventiveness. In Transvaal and Orange Free State 
Chamber of Mines v Hukki90 Galgut, J. had regard to all prior art in assessing 
whether the patent involved an inventive step: 
“The evidence leaves no doubt that each of the three integers claimed is part of the 
common knowledge in the art.  It is also clear that in operating tumbling mills it is common 
knowledge that speed and volume of load (between the limits of 25 per cent and 60 per 
cent) and weight or mass of load are variables which must be adjusted by the mill 
operator to achieve the best results. If one has regard to all the above91 it seems to me 
clear that the respondent cannot contend that the mere choice of a speed for autogenous 
grinding or any other grinding is an inventive step. … 
                                                 
87
  Refer to 4.3.2  What comprises the state of the art (step 2).  
88
  Refer to 4.3.3  Considering “obviousness” (step 4). 
89
  Refer to 4.3.4  What entails a “person skilled in the art”. 
90
  [1964] 3 All SA 96 (T). 
91
  Emphasis added. 
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It may well be that a combination of commonly known steps may be patentable if the 
combination is in itself inventive.92  In the present case the combination consists merely of 
a reference to a relationship between commonly known variables which does not involve 
ingenuity.”93 
Refer below94 for a further discussion on the matter. 
4.3.3. Considering “obviousness” (step 4) 
The Patents Act deems an invention to involve an inventive step if it is not obvious to 
a person skilled in the art.  The fourth step of the Ensign Brickford inquiry deals with 
the question whether the inventive step claimed can be regarded as obvious to a 
person skilled in the art.  A magnitude of decisions dealing with this inquiry was laid 
down under the former Patents Act.  Although the former Patents Act is no longer in 
effect, the decisions laid down in this regard are still applicable.95  The factors 
considered by the court in assessing inventiveness will be discussed below. 
4.3.3.1. Substantial improvement or step forward 
An inventive step requires inventive ingenuity.  The fact that an invention has 
brought about a substantial improvement in a certain field or has led to an important 
step forward in that field is not enough to establish inventiveness.96 Wessels, J.A 
held: 
“However new or striking the application may be, if in so doing the engineer has only 
used the knowledge of the time and has not had recourse to invention, he has no more 
right to a monopoly than anyone else who judiciously uses that which science has put into 
his hands.”97 
                                                 
92
  Emphasis added. 
93
  Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines v Hukki [1964] 3 All SA 96 (T) at page 106. 
94
  Refer to 4.3.3.4  Combination of old ideas. 
95
  Steyn The Law of South Africa (2010). 
96
  Marine Construction & Design Co v Hansen’s Marine Equipment (Pty) Ltd 1972 2 SA 181 (AD) 
196G-H. 
97
  Veasy v Denver Rock Drill and Machinery Co Ltd 1930 AD 243 at page 276. 
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Furthermore, a step can be considered to be inventive even if it only represents a 
step “sideways”, for instance when an alternative is provided and not necessarily an 
improvement, provided that the alternative still involves inventive ingenuity.98  
From the above it is clear that a substantial improvement or step forward is not a 
requirement for inventiveness, however it is submitted that such an improvement or 
step forward is likely to lessen the burden of proof. 
4.3.3.2. Reasonable probability 
Where the nature of the previous art is such, that the invention is something a 
person skilled in the art would naturally try, there is no inventive step.99  The prior 
knowledge need not be absolute or definite knowledge in order to prove 
obviousness; it must merely result in a reasonable probability that a skilled person 
would have been led to do the experiment.  In the Transvaal & OFS Chamber of 
Mines case, Galgut, J. held that the choice of speed of operating a grinder was not 
an inventive step given that prior art has put forward the use of supercritical speeds 
in tube milling as advantageous.  It was therefore reasonably probable that a person 
skilled in the art would attempt drilling by selecting a supercritical speed in the 
suggested range.  Galgut, J. held that: 
“White described and examined rotation at supercritical speeds as a substantial 
possibility, and whilst it is true that even after his publications in 1905 and 1915 
supercritical speeds were not used in practice, the publication by Fahrenwald and Lee 
and Fahrenwald in 1931 and 1934 put forward the use of supercritical speeds in tube 
milling as advantageous.   
There can be no doubt from the evidence and publications that speed is but one of many 
variables which has to be taken into account in the design and operation of mills.  In the 
light of the above, the respondent could certainly not claim that the mere choice of a 
speed of operation for grinding is an inventive step”100 
                                                 
98
  B-M Group (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Ltd 1980 2 All SA 531 (A); 1980 4 SA 536 (AD) 557A-D. 
99
  Testrup v Crosfield & Sons Ltd 1913 AD 1 at page 14. 
100
 Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines v Hukki [1964] 3 All SA 96 (T) at pages 105-
106. 
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In the alternative, when an invention is so much out of track of previous work as not 
to suggest itself naturally to a person considering the problem, an inventive step will 
be present.101 
4.3.3.3. Production of a practical result 
The mere production of a practical result does not by itself render the invention non-
obvious.102  Likewise, the perception and disclosure of previously unrealised 
advantages in a known article or process in itself is not sufficient proof of 
inventiveness.103   
Where a method is known in general application and that method is applied to a 
particular purpose one can only claim inventiveness if special problems had to be 
overcome in order to apply that method to the particular purpose.104 
4.3.3.4. Combination of old ideas 
As mentioned above, in assessing inventiveness one must have regard to the prior 
art as a whole, i.e. the mosaic rule finds no application.  This increases the burden of 
proof in showing inventiveness as compared to showing novelty.  In proving novelty, 
one can rely on the fact that although the invention consists of a combination of 
previously known facts, the particular combination was not contained in a prior single 
publication and therefore qualifies as a new invention.  However, when proving 
inventiveness it is irrelevant whether the combination was contained in a single 
publication or in several prior publications.  The prior art as a whole is considered.  
This however does not mean that a combination of previously known facts will never 
be inventive.  The courts have recognised that where individually known elements 
are combined in a new functional combination, a valid patent may be obtained, i.e. 
the invention is non-obvious.105  The real and ultimate question in evaluating a claim 
                                                 
101
 Hills v Livingstone-Jackson 1935 NPD 5 at page 17. 
102
  Testruip v Crosfield & Sons Ltd 1914 AD 1 at page 14. 
103
  Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines v Hukki [1964] 3 All SA 96 (T).  
104
  Drummond-Hay v Fram & Co (Pty) Ltd 1963 3 All SA 370 (A). 
105
  In the Transvaal & Orange Freestate Chamber of Mines v Hukki [1964] 3 All SA 96 (T), Galgut, J. 
held at page 106 that “It may well be that a combination of commonly known steps may be 
patentable if the combination is in itself inventive.” 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
for a combination is:  “is the combination obvious or not?”.106 In making this 
assessment the courts have warned against an approach that examines each 
element in isolation in order to see whether its use was obvious or not, seeing as it 
tends to obscure that the invention claimed is a combination.107 Hopely, J. 
summarised it as follows: 
“It is true that, although these things may be obvious the combination may be 
ingenious.”108 
4.3.3.5. Commercial success 
Patentees have often relied on the fact that a particular invention has achieved 
commercial success in order to prove inventiveness.  However, the presence of 
commercial success does not always establish inventive ingenuity, just as the 
converse is not necessarily true, namely that the absence of commercial success 
establishes absence of inventive ingenuity.109 In the Ensign-Brickford case Plewman, 
J.A. held that: 
“Firstly the question to be determined is whether what is claimed as inventive would have 
been obvious not whether it would have been commercially worthwhile.”110  
The appellate division of the UK dealt with this issue in particular detail.  In the case 
before the court, i.e. Windsurfing International Inc. v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) 
Ltd111 the defence for the plaintiff argued that seeing as the prior publication112 did 
not generate any interest as it was not perceived as a commercially worthwhile 
concept, the subsequent improvement of the invention described by Darby cannot be 
viewed as being obvious.  The argument led: 
                                                 
106
 Steyn The Law of South Africa (2010). 
107
 Vine v Barratt & Pillans Ltd, West Rand Engineering Works (Pty) v Varratt & Pillans Ltd 1939 WLD 
238 above 252. 
108
  Ransby & Covell v Woudberg (1907) 24 SC 91 at page 98. 
109
  Steyn The Law of South Africa (2010). 
110
  Ensign-Brickford (SA) (Pty) Ltd and others AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd [1998] 4 All SA 
453 (A) at page 461. 
111
  [1985] R.P.C (G.B.) Ltd. 
112
  An article written by a Mr Darby entitled “Sailboarding: Exiting New Water Sport”. 
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“…although he accepts Darby as a relevant document which could be assumed to be 
within the knowledge of the skilled man, nevertheless, when considering whether the 
patent in suit is an obvious development, one has to consider what a person confronted 
with Darby in 1966 would actually have done.  If, he suggests, there was then no reason 
for considering Darby to be of any interest, the improvement of Darby, even by what 
might be considered mere workshop trial and error, would not have been obvious.”113  
The defence for the plaintiff was therefore of the view that the improvements to the 
Darby invention effected by the plaintiff, rendered a previously non-practical 
invention commercially worthwhile and for this reason the patent in suit should be 
viewed as non-obvious.  Oliver, J., in his judgement, disagreed with this argument 
and held that such a view obscures the real question.  The real, and only, question 
for consideration according to Oliver, J. is: 
“What has to be determined is whether what is now claimed as inventive would have 
been obvious, not whether it would have appeared commercially worthwhile to exploit 
it.”114 
Oliver, J. goes on to say: 
“In summary, Mr Pumfrey’s submission is that in 1966 nobody would have considered 
Darby as more than a beach novelty … and that, therefore, nobody would in fact have 
been interested in doing anything more than, perhaps, building it and playing with it.  
Thus, the argument proceeds, there would not have been any reason for developing 
Darby and hence no development, even of a routine nature, would have been obvious or 
even have occurred to the skilled man, who would merely have dismissed Darby as a not 
very practical toy.  It is from this foundation that he goes on to submit that the learned 
judge asked himself the wrong question and wrongly accepted as evidence of what was 
obvious the evidence of witnesses as to how Darby might have been improved, for, in 
suggesting improvements to or embellishments upon that which called for no 
improvement of embellishment, they were doing so in response to an invitation to treat 
Darby as a springboard to further development and invention and were in fact suggesting 
inventive steps. 
We have not felt able to accept Mr. Pumfrey’s submissions.”115 
                                                 
113
  Windsurfing International Inc. v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] R.P.C (G.B.) Ltd at lines 
18-25,  page 72. 
114
 Windsurfing International Inc. v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] R.P.C (G.B.) Ltd at lines 
49-51, page 72. 
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From the above judgement it is again made clear that the only question for 
consideration is whether the step claimed to be inventive would have been obvious 
to a person skilled in the art even though the prior art did not raise any commercial 
interest at the time of its publication. 
It is however submitted that the achievement of commercial success will lessen the 
burden of proof for the patentee claiming inventiveness.  However, if there is any 
indication that the commercial success was the result of external factors such as 
effective advertising, the court seldom has regard to the commercial success in 
considering inventiveness.116 
4.3.4. What entails a “person skilled in the art” 
The meaning of the term “person skilled in the art” is crucial in the evaluation of 
inventiveness as it marks the level of skill against which the new invention is to be 
evaluated.  However, within a specific art, various levels of skill exist.  In this regard, 
the Patents Act is silent on the level of skill to be used as a measuring tool, i.e. the 
ordinary worker or the field expert.  Furthermore, the Patents Act is silent on the level 
of knowledge to be attributed to the skilled worker, i.e. ordinary working knowledge 
used in day-to-day operations or all the materials forming part of the state of the art.   
The answers to these questions will have a significant influence on the ambit of the 
test for inventiveness.  For this reason, a study of the meaning and scope of the term 
will be conducted below. 
As mentioned above, the Patents Act does not contain a definition of what 
constitutes a ‘person skilled in the art’.  The EPO Guidelines, however, contains the 
following definition: 
“The ‘person skilled in the art’ should be presumed to be a skilled practitioner in the 
relevant field, who is possessed of average knowledge and ability and is aware of what 
was common general knowledge in the art at the relevant date. … He should also be 
                                                                                                                                                        
115
  Windsurfing International Inc. v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] R.P.C (G.B.) Ltd at lines 
30-45, page 73. 
116
  Miller v Boxes & Shooks (Pty) Ltd 1945 AD 561 above 586. 
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presumed to have had access to everything in the “state of the art”, … and to have had at 
his disposal the normal means and capacity for routine work and experimentation.”117   
In formulating the test for inventiveness, the Supreme Court of Appeal118 shed 
further light on the meaning and scope to be applied to a “person skilled in the art”.  
The test was formulated as follows:  
“Whether or not the ordinary person skilled in the relevant art could, if faced with the 
problem solved by the invention, and having regard to what was common knowledge in 
the art at the time, and using his intelligence, easily have provided the solution or taken 
the step taken by the patentee.”119 
From the above the following becomes apparent: 
- The ordinary worker in the art is to be referred to as opposed to experts in the 
particular field;  
- The worker is presumed to have an average knowledge and ability;  
- The worker is presumed to be aware of what constitutes common knowledge 
in the field; and 
- The worker is presumed to have access to everything in the state of the art, 
i.e. public knowledge. 
From the above it is apparent that there is a distinction between common knowledge 
in the art and public knowledge.  The EPO Guidelines presume a person skilled in 
the art to possess common knowledge in the art and to have access to everything in 
the state of the art, i.e. public knowledge.120  From these two distinct attributes it is 
clear that public knowledge encompasses common knowledge, whereas public 
knowledge will not always be common knowledge in a particular art. In the Transvaal 
and OFS Chamber of Mines case, the distinction between common knowledge and 
                                                 
117
  European Patent Office Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (2010) Part C, 
Chapter IV, pages 32-33. 
118
  Marine Construction & Design Co v Hansen’s Marine Equipment (Pty) Ltd above 193A-C. 
119
  above 193A-C. 
120
  In section 25(6) of the Patents Act the “state of the art” is defined to comprise all matter which has 
been made available to the public by written or oral description, by use or in any other way. 
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public knowledge was elucidated by the construction placed on “common 
knowledge” by the court.  Galgut, J. held: 
“It was pointed out that not everything in a known publication is common knowledge.  
There must be something more.  But that something more need not be “acceptance” in 
the sense that the views of the writer are unreservedly accepted as a solution of some 
problem in the art, or his suggestions put into operation.  It is sufficient that the disclosure 
is accepted by the bulk of those engaged in the art, in the sense that it “becomes part of 
their common stock of knowledge relating to the art”.”121 
A clear distinction between the two concepts was also drawn in the Gentiruco case. 
Trollip, J.A. held: 
“As previously mentioned, Veasy’s case adopts throughout the inquiry into inventiveness 
the criterion of common knowledge.  That might conceivably be something less than the 
state of the prior art, for the latter might include the information of learning of some highly 
skilled or erudite workers or specialists in the art or science, which is unknown to the 
general body of ordinary, skilled or qualified workers.”122 
Trollip, J.A. further emphasizes that the knowledge to be regarded when assessing 
inventiveness is the knowledge which the ordinary skilled worker already possess 
and not the knowledge accessible to him.  He held: 
“The knowledge available” is used synonymously with “what was generally known”, and it 
means nothing more than common knowledge in the sense discussed above.  It does not 
mean, as Firestone contended, “the knowledge accessible” to the ordinary mechanic in 
libraries or other repositories of publications.  The knowledge is such, according to the 
passage, as would have enabled the ordinary mechanic, when confronted by the 
inventor’s problem, to take the step easily himself.  That points irresistibly to knowledge 
with which he is already equipped, that he already carries about with him in his mind, and 
not that which he has to seek out in a library, etc.  The contention for Firestone confuses 
public knowledge with common knowledge.  The former is the knowledge that is 
accessible to the public by reason of its having been published; the latter is the 
knowledge in fact possessed by the generality of persons duly qualified or skilled in the 
particular art or science.”123 
                                                 
121
  Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines v Hukki [1964] 3 All SA 96 (T) at page 105. 
122
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972} 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 261. 
123
  Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd [1972} 1 All SA 201 (A) at page 261. 
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From the above dictums it is clear that not all published knowledge, i.e. public 
knowledge, can be considered to form part of the common working knowledge of the 
ordinary skilled worker.  In order for a published article to be considered part of the 
common knowledge of the ordinary skilled worker, the article must be accepted by 
the majority of the art craftsmen in such a way that it becomes part of their general 
stock of knowledge.  The knowledge attained from the publication is not required to 
be put into use by the ordinary skilled worker.  It must merely form part of his working 
knowledge of the art in which he operates.   
Common knowledge is the working knowledge required of an ordinary skilled worker 
in a particular art.  It is this common knowledge that the court presumes a person 
skilled in the art to draw on in the court’s evaluation of whether the step forward is 
one to have been easily taken by the worker.  
This, however, does not mean that no regard is to be had to public knowledge in this 
assessment.  The EPO Guidelines define a person skilled in the art to have access 
to everything in the state of the art.  Furthermore, section 25(10) of the Patents Act 
stipulates that regard must be had to the state of the art when assessing 
inventiveness.  It is therefore submitted that although it is the worker’s common 
knowledge that serves as criteria for inventiveness, this knowledge should be 
evaluated bearing in mind that the worker has access to all prior art in order to 
supplement any shortcomings in his common knowledge. 
Therefore, if the ordinary skilled worker applies his intelligence to the problem 
presented and he, upon drawing on his common knowledge in the field, easily finds 
the solution to the problem presented, the steps taken to solve the problem cannot 
be viewed to be inventive.  This will be the case whether the ordinary skilled worker 
researched prior art to supplement any shortcomings in his common knowledge 
utilised to solve the problem or not.   
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4.4. Conclusion 
In order for an invention to be considered “non-obvious” in terms of the Patents Act, 
the invention claimed must be non-obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art.  In 
making this assessment, regard is to be had to all prior art as a whole.  The mosaic 
rule finds no application when considering “obviousness’.  Therefore, if the invention 
claimed is a combination of old ideas, and the combination in itself is not obvious to 
a person skilled in the art, the invention will be considered non-obvious. 
The test formulated by our courts to test for obviousness is whether an ordinary 
person skilled in the art would have easily solved the problem faced by the inventor 
by using his intelligence and having regard to what was common knowledge in the 
art at the time.  Common knowledge refers to the working knowledge possessed by 
the ordinary worker and does not encompass all published knowledge or prior art.  
The ordinary worker may however in his quest to solve the problem presented to 
him, have recourse to prior art, but it is presumed that reliance on his common 
knowledge alone would have easily led him to find the answer so sought.   
In assessing obviousness, the courts have made it clear that the only real question 
to be asked is whether the step taken was an obvious one.  Secondary factors such 
as a significant advance in the field, the production of a practical result or the 
achievement of commercial success may only serve to lessen the burden of proof, 
but it does not in itself prove that the invention claimed is non-obvious in nature.  
The R&D incentive article refers to a “discovery” of novel, practical and non-obvious 
information.  However, patent law denies discoveries the status of an “invention” and 
therefore the benefit of patent protection.  The meaning of “novel” in Chapter 3 and 
the meaning of “non-obvious” in Chapter 4 were studied with reference to IP law and 
jurisprudence, hence as it applies to an invention.  Chapter 5 will study whether the 
exclusion of discoveries as an invention will have any effect on the meanings of 
“novel” and “non-obvious” as applied to the discovery of information for purposes of 
the R&D tax incentive. 
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5.1. Introduction 
In Chapters 3 and 4 the meaning of “novel” and “non-obvious” was studied in terms 
of IP law and jurisprudence.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Patents Act 
distinguishes between an ‘invention’ and a ‘discovery’ by specifically excluding 
‘discoveries’ from the scope of an invention.124  Hence the meaning of “novel” and 
“non-obvious” was construed by our IP courts in the context of an ‘invention’.    
Attorneys, Sibanda & Zantwijk submit that a “discovery” presupposes a pre-existing, 
intangible asset while an invention results in something new.125  This raises the 
question whether the construction placed on “new” and “non-obvious” in relation to 
an invention, could be applied mutatis mutandis to a discovery as envisaged by 
section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.  
This chapter aims to address this issue and will commence with a study of the 
difference in nature between an invention and a discovery, followed by an 
assessment of the effect this difference holds and will conclude in a final construction 
to be placed on the meaning of “new” and “non-obvious” with regards to a discovery 
of information. 
5.2. Invention v discovery 
5.2.1. Invention 
For purposes of the Patents Act, Section 2 of the said act defines an invention as 
one for which a patent may be granted under section 25.  This definition however 
only defines the characteristics required of an invention for purposes of patent 
protection in terms of the Patents Act. It does not define the nature of an invention.  
Therefore, the word, “invention” must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning.126  
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines an “invention” as: 
                                                 
124
  Section 25(2) of the Patents Act. 
125
  Sibanda & Zantwijk S11D: R&D Tax Incentive – Discussion Document (2007) 6. 
126
  Clegg & Stretch  Income Tax in South Africa (2007) 2.6. 
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“noun [mass noun] the action of inventing something, typically a process or device”127 
The word “invent” is furthermore defined as: 
“verb [with obj.] create or design (something that has not existed before); be the 
originator of”128 
From the above it is clear that an invention results in something being created that 
has never existed before.  The invention is therefore completely new in all regards. 
5.2.2. Discovery  
Neither the Patents Act nor the Income Tax Act defines a “discovery”.  The word 
must therefore be given its ordinary dictionary meaning.129   
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, a discovery is: 
“noun (pl. discoveries) [mass noun] 1 the action or process of discovering or being 
discovered”130 
The word “discover” is furthermore defined as: 
“verb [with obj.] 1 find unexpectedly or during a search: ... ■ become aware of (a fact or 
situation): … ■ be the first to find or observe (a place, substance, or scientific 
phenomenon): … ■ be the first to recognise the potential of (an actor or performer): …”131 
From the above, it is clear that the act of discovering, results in finding something 
that already exists.132  The discoverer is therefore not the originator, as is the case 
with an invention. The crux of a discovery however, is that the discoverer is the first 
to find such thing.   
                                                 
127
  Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 919. 
128
  Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 919. 
129
  Clegg & Stretch Income Tax in South Africa (2007) 2.6. 
130
  Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 500. 
131
 Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 500. 
132
  “For example, discovering the characteristics of a compound which already exists in nature but 
which are, prior thereto, unidentified” (Tshaya Section 11D – Research and Development Incentive 
(2010) 16.). 
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In summation, an invention results in the creation of something which did not exist 
before, i.e. something new.  A discovery, on the other hand, involves the act of 
finding something which already exists.   
It is apparent that there is a vast difference between the ordinary meaning of an 
invention and the ordinary meaning of a discovery.  Characteristics such as being 
“new” and involving an “inventive step”133 appear to be unique to an invention.  
Nonetheless, the Income Tax Act refers to the “discovery of novel, practical and non 
obvious information”.134  This appears to be paradoxical in nature, seeing as a 
discovery is the act of finding something which already existed and which therefore 
cannot be something new.   
From the above it is clear that the construction placed on “new” and “non-obvious” by 
IP jurisprudence cannot blindly be adopted for purposes of section 11D(1)(a) of the 
Income Tax Act.  This is due to the vast difference in nature between an “invention” 
and a “discovery”.  Below, the effect of this difference on the construction135 to be 
adopted for purposes of the R&D incentive section136 will be considered. 
5.3. Considering the effect of the difference between an invention and a 
discovery on the construction of “novel” and “non-obvious” in terms of  
section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act 
5.3.1. Novelty 
As mentioned above, to use the terms “discovery” and “new” alongside each other 
seems paradoxical in nature.  Although the R&D tax incentive section refers to 
“novel” information, the word “novel” originates from the Latin word “novus” which 
means “new”.137  
Attorneys, Sibanda & Zantwijk are of the opinion that: 
                                                 
133
  Section 25(10) of the Patents Act deems an invention to involve an inventive step if it is not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to the state of the art at the priority date. 
134
  See section 11D(1)(a). 
135
  Vis-à-vis novelty and obviousness. 
136
  Section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
137
  Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010:1215. 
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“The terms “discovery” (in the pre-existing sense) and “novel” are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive:  “Novel” means “strikingly new, unusual, or different”; and “new” is 
generally defined in our Patents and Designs Acts as information which does not “form 
part of the state of the art, … [i.e. excluding] all matter which has been made available to 
the public (whether in the Republic or elsewhere) by written or oral description, by use or 
in any other way”.” 138 
The argument raised by attorneys, Sibanda & Zantwijk is that the information 
discovered can still be regarded as “new” as long as it did not form part of the public 
domain prior to the discovery thereof. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the difference in nature between a discovery and an 
invention does not hinder the adoption of the meaning of “new” as construed by IP 
jurisprudence in interpreting the novelty requirement for purposes of the R&D tax 
incentive section.  The Patents Act regards an invention as new, if it did not form part 
of the state of the art prior to the invention thereof.  Likewise, a discovery can be 
regarded as new if it did not form part of the state of the art prior to the discovery 
thereof.  Thus, despite the fact that the information discovered already existed prior 
to the discovery thereof, it can still be regarded as new in terms of the definition of 
“new” of the Patents Act.   
However, the difference in the wording used between the two Acts is one that cannot 
be overlooked.  The Income Tax Act uses the word “novel” whereas the Patents Act 
uses the word “new”.  Although, as mentioned above, the word “novel” originates 
from the Latin word “novus” which means “new”, the two words bear slightly different 
ordinary meanings.  This raises the question why the legislature would use the word 
“novel” and not the word “new” as is used by the Patents Act.  If his intention was to 
subject a discovery to the same requirements as is set for an invention in regards to 
patent protection, why use different wording?   
Before attempting to answer the above question, the difference in meaning between 
“new” and “novel” must be studied. 
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines “novel” as: 
                                                 
138
  Sibanda & Zantwijk S11D: R&D Tax Incentive – Discussion Document (2007) 6. 
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“adjective interestingly new or unusual”139 
“Unusual” is further defined as: 
“adjective not habitually or commonly occurring or done”140 
From the above it is clear that the ordinary meaning of ‘novel’ can encompass the 
discovery of information that did form part of the public domain prior to the discovery 
thereof but is not commonly encountered or observed in the public domain.  
The ordinary meaning of “novel” has a greater ambit than the meaning of “new” as 
construed by IP law.  Thus, if the ordinary meaning of “novel” is to be adopted in 
interpreting section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, a greater number of 
discoveries will qualify for the R&D tax incentive allowance as opposed to adopting 
the meaning of “new” as construed by IP law.   
In deciding which interpretation should be followed (i.e. the more liberal or restrictive 
construction), the intention of the legislature with the enactment of the provision 
should be sought and given effect to.  In Chapter 2, it was shown that the intention of 
the legislature with the enactment of section 11D was to stimulate R&D activities of a 
scientific and technological nature which would result in new knowledge and not 
merely represent routine learning activities as part of ongoing processes.   
The Explanatory Memorandum issued on the enactment of section 11D makes it 
clear that it was the intention of the legislature to stimulate R&D activities which 
would result in new knowledge.  It is therefore submitted that the word “novel” is to 
be interpreted in the strict sense, thus awarding it the meaning of “new” as construed 
by IP law in order to give effect to the intention of the legislature. 
By following such a restrictive approach, only discoveries made of information which 
did not form part of the state of the art prior to the discovery thereof, will qualify for 
the 150 per cent R&D incentive allowance. 
                                                 
139
  Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 1215. 
140
  Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 1953. 
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This view is also supported by Darren Margo, a registered patent attorney and tax 
practitioner, who held: 
“At the heart of both the law of patents and designs is the concept of ‘novelty’ and what it 
means to be ‘new’.  Essentially, an invention is patentable and a design is registerable 
only in cases where very strict novelty requirements are satisfied.  Equally fundamental in 
the field of patent law is the principle of ‘inventiveness’, which also has its own peculiar 
meaning. Over the decades, these technical and specific definitions have been 
established, applied and interpreted rigorously and carefully by our courts. 
In Note 50, however, instead of referring to the wealth of jurisprudence on the matter, 
SARS has elected to re-event the proverbial wheel – by attempting its own definitions and 
standards for these critical terms.”141 
Such a restrictive approach is further supported by the fact that the nature of a 
discovery implies that the discoverer is the first to find such a thing.  This effectively 
excludes any unusual information seeing as it already formed part of the state of the 
art prior to the “discovery” thereof.  Thus, the discoverer would not be the first to find 
such information.  The fact that the information is not commonly encountered or 
observed in the public domain is irrelevant.  
In adopting this view, the meaning of “new” as laid out in Chapter 3 is to be adopted 
mutatis mutandis for purposes of section 11D(1)(a) in regards to the “novel” 
requirement.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Patents Act deems an invention to be 
new if it did not form part of the state of the art on the priority date.  The state of the 
art comprises all matter made available to the public, both local and international, by 
written or oral description, use or in any other way.142  A discovery will therefore be 
regarded as "novel” if the discoverer was the first to find such information which 
already existed, but did not form part of the public domain, i.e. the state of the art at 
the date of the discovery.  
                                                 
141
  Margo “An Assault on the Taxpayer and on Practitioners – by SARS” 2009(December) De Rebus 
39-40.  Margo criticizes SARS’ adoption of the ordinary meaning of the words “novel” and “non-
obvious”.  He states that these terms have been interpreted rigorously and carefully by our IP 
courts and that such wealth of jurisprudence should be referred to in interpreting section 11D(1)(a) 
of the Income Tax Act.   
142
  Section 25(6) of the Patents Act. 
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5.3.2. Non-obvious 
The Patents Act regards an invention to involve an inventive step if it is not obvious 
to a person skilled in the art.143  As laid out in Chapter 4, the test formulated by our 
courts to test for obviousness, in the context of IP law, is whether an ordinary person 
skilled in the art, using his intelligence, would have easily created the invention 
claimed by the inventor to be non-obvious, having regard to what was common 
knowledge144 in the art at the time.     
As mentioned above, the act of inventing, results in something being created that did 
not exist before, whereas a discovery involves the act of being the first to find 
something that already existed.  There is no apparent reason why the test formulated 
to assess “obviousness” cannot be adopted mutatis mutandis for the purposes of 
evaluating obviousness in terms of section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.   
However, before such meaning is adopted, the ordinary meaning of the word is to be 
studied.  The Oxford Dictionary of English has no definition for the word “non-
obvious” but it does define the word “obvious” as: 
“adjective easily perceived or understood; clear; self-evident; or apparent”145 
From the above it can be inferred that “non-obvious” means that something is not 
easily perceived or understood by the ordinary man.  The interpretation awarded to 
“non-obvious” by the Patents Act however has a much narrower interpretation of 
“non-obvious” in that it specifies that the invention must not be obvious to a person 
skilled in the art.  It is clear that there is a vast difference in the ambit of the two 
interpretations (i.e. ordinary meaning versus the IP law meaning).  
Once again, in deciding which interpretation should be followed (i.e. the more liberal 
or restrictive construction), the intention of the legislature with the enactment of the 
                                                 
143
  Section 25(10) of the Patents Act. 
144
  Common knowledge refers to the working knowledge possessed by the ordinary worker and does 
not encompass all published knowledge or prior art.  The ordinary worker may however in his 
quest to solve the problem presented, have recourse to prior art, but it is presumed that reliance 
on his common knowledge alone would have easily led him to find the answer sought. 
145
  Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 1226. 
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provision should be sought and given effect to.  It is clear that the legislature had in 
mind the advancement of technology and science in order to achieve sustained 
growth in South Africa with the enactment of section 11D(1)(a).  The field of science 
and technology is a specialist field, and one not commonly understood by the 
ordinary man.  Thus, inherent in the “non-obvious” requirement is the presumption 
that the discovery must be non-obvious to a person skilled in the art, seeing as the 
discovery will only qualify for the tax incentive if the information is of a scientific and 
technological nature.  
 It is therefore submitted that the “non-obvious” requirement should be awarded the 
same meaning as laid down by IP jurisprudence in terms of inventions as the 
ordinary meaning of the word will not give effect to the intention of the lawgiver. 
This submission is also supported by Patent Attorney, Darren Margo.146 
Therefore, it is submitted that the discovery of information will be regarded as non-
obvious for purposes of section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act if the information 
discovered is not obvious to the ordinary worker skilled in the art, having regard to 
what formed part of the state of the art on the relevant date. 
5.4. Conclusion 
A study of the ordinary meaning of an ‘invention’ and a ‘discovery’ has shown that an 
invention results in the creation of something which did not exist before, whereas a 
discovery involves the act of being the first to find something which did exist before.  
The difference in nature between an invention and a discovery however does not 
hinder the adoption of the meaning of “novel” and “non-obvious” for purposes of the 
R&D tax incentive in the context of a discovery.  A discovery, like an invention, can 
be regarded as “new” if the information discovered did not form part of the state of 
the art prior to the discovery thereof.  Furthermore, a discovery, like an invention, 
can be regarded as non-obvious if the information discovered is not obvious to the 
ordinary worker skilled in the art, having regard to the state of the art on the relevant 
date.  The fact that the Patents Act denies discoveries the status of invention, 
                                                 
146
  Refer to 5.3.1 (page 50) above. 
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therefore presents no hindrance in adopting the meanings of “new” and “non-
obvious” for purposes of section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
In construing section 11D(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, the ordinary meanings of 
“novel” and “non-obvious” were also considered.   
Something is novel if it is strikingly new or unusual.  The ordinary meaning of “novel” 
has the effect that the discovery of information which formed part of the public 
domain prior to the discovery thereof will still qualify for the tax incentive provided 
that it was not commonly encountered or observed in the public domain. 
Something is non-obvious if it is not easily perceived or understood by the ordinary 
man.  The ordinary meaning of non-obvious has the effect that the discovery of 
information which is obvious to a person skilled in the art will still qualify for the tax 
incentive provided that the information discovered is not obvious to the ordinary man.  
It was submitted that the adoption of the ordinary meanings of “novel” and “non-
obvious” will result in section 11D(1)(a) having an ambit which is far greater than the 
legislature intended it to be.  The intention of the legislature with the enactment of 
section 11D was to stimulate a very specific kind of R&D activity in order to achieve 
sustained economic growth over the long term.  Any construction which would result 
in basic R&D activities qualifying for the incentive will be counter-productive to the 
intention of the legislature as it will not result in the creation of new knowledge of a 
scientific or technological nature. 
Thus, in order to give effect to the intention of the legislature, it is submitted that the 
meanings attributed to “novel”147 and “non-obvious”148 in terms of IP jurisprudence 
should be adopted mutatis mutandis for purposes of section 11D(1)(a) of the Income 
Tax Act.  
 
                                                 
147
  Refer Chapter 3. 
148
  Refer Chapter 4. 
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6.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, patent attorney Darren Margo highlighted several issues 
providing particular heartache to taxpayers in his article concerning the new R&D tax 
incentive.  In particular he criticised SARS’ interpretation of the “novelty” concept and 
the exclusion of “internal business processes” from R&D activities as applied to the 
development of computer programs.   
The first part of this study was devoted to providing guidance on the interpretation of 
the concepts of “novelty” and “non-obviousness” in the context of the discovery of 
information as an eligible R&D activity.  The second part of this study will address 
what is considered to be the most contentious issue with the newly introduced R&D 
section at present, i.e. the development of computer programs as an eligible R&D 
activity especially in the context of the “management and internal business 
processes” exclusion. 
This can be evidenced by several articles published on the issue since the release of 
SARS’ Interpretation Note 50 in 2009. 
Margo is of the opinion that SARS’ interpretation is so draconian that it destroys the 
incentive entirely:  
“The incentive is qualified elsewhere in the Act – specifically in s 11D(5)(b) – by an 
exclusion against expenditure relating to ‘management or internal business process’.  So, 
for example, work conducted on creating computer programs to integrate payroll 
applications with SAP systems in a taxpayer’s business would not qualify for a s 11D 
deduction.  This exclusion is in line with Frascati. 
SARS, however, has taken this exclusion to staggering extremes.  In Note 50, it has 
adopted an interpretation so draconian that even companies such as Microsoft, Sun 
Microsystems and SAP – all world-leaders in this field of technology – would fail to qualify 
for the deduction.  In this case too, SARS appears unwilling to provide even one example 
of a software-related activity that would qualify for the deduction under its interpretation.  
It bears mentioning that as far as I am aware, no other revenue authority anywhere in the 
world, adopts a view as severe as this.” 
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Simply put:  While our legislature has created legislation, insisting that this incentive must 
be granted to developers of software, SARS has interpreted the qualification so narrowly 
that it has effectively destroyed the incentive entirely.”149 
Patent attorney with Adams & Adams, Tumelo Tshaya is of the opinion that the 
interpretation of the exclusion as applied to computer program development is a 
litigious matter: 
“The South African Revenue Service (SARS) states that software packages developed 
for administration, human resources or accounting purposes are excluded from the tax 
incentive as they constitute management or internal business processes.  Moreover, 
SARS’s view is that all computer programs that automate internal business processes or 
create management efficiencies, do not qualify, even if the developed program is to be 
sold to third parties and is not for the company’s internal use.  This has a negative effect 
as it may exclude most software development companies from claiming the research and 
development deduction.  It is a litigious issue and relevant stakeholders can only hope 
that SARS will, in due course, alter its view.”150    
This issue is also viewed as contentious by audit firms who provide tax services to 
their clients as per Dawid van der Berg, an associate director of tax at BDO Spence 
Steward: 
“It is worth noting that novelty is not required when it comes to computer programs. 
However, in terms of section 11D(5) of the Act, no deduction will be allowed in respect of 
any cost or expenditure relating to ‘management or internal business processes'. Due to a 
lack of guidance by the courts, this exclusion is highly contentious and taxpayers and the 
South African Revenue Service are often at odds as to exactly what constitutes 
‘management or internal business processes'.”151 
This chapter aims to address the above outlined issue by conducting a study of the 
intention of Treasury with the introduction of the R&D incentive for computer program 
development and by comparing South Africa’s R&D legislation with the likes of 
Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. 
                                                 
149
  Margo “An Assault on the Taxpayer and on Practitioners – by SARS” 2009(December) De Rebus 
39-40. 
150
  Tshaya “Squeezing Out the Benefits of R&D” 2011(February) Without Prejudice 16. 
151
  Van der Berg “The Section 11D Research and Development Tax Incentive” 2011 Moneyweb Tax.  
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This chapter will commence with a view of the controversial interpretation of SARS 
which has sparked the above outcry amongst academics, tax advisors and patent 
attorneys.  This will be followed by a study of the Explanatory Memoranda issued by 
Treasury on the introduction of the R&D legislation in order to attain the intention of 
the lawgiver in this regard.  The R&D Guidelines issued by Sibanda & Zantwijk as 
consultants to Treasury on this section will also be consulted.  Hereafter, the R&D 
provisions relating to computer development as currently enforced in South Africa 
will be compared to the likes of Australia, the UK and Canada.  The chapter will 
conclude with a recommended construction to be placed on the above exclusion as 
applied to the development of computer programs as an eligible R&D activity.  
6.2. SARS Interpretation 
Section 11D was introduced into the South African tax regime during 2006.  SARS 
however only published its Draft Interpretation Note on section 11D during 
November 2008 with the finalised version of the Interpretation Note, i.e. 
Interpretation Note 50 following in August 2009.  It is clear from the extensive time 
lapse between the introduction of the section by Treasury and the release of SARS’ 
final interpretation note thereon, that SARS struggled to give meaning to the 
provisions contained in section 11D of the Income Tax Act. 
In construing the type of computer development activities that would qualify for the 
R&D tax incentive, Interpretation Note 50 refers to the expenditure listed in section 
11D(5) as non deductible for purposes of the tax incentive.  Included in the list of 
non-deductible expenditure, are “management or internal business processes” 
expenses and “market research, sales or marketing promotion” expenses.  The 
Interpretation Note continues to state the following: 
“These excluded activities are especially relevant in considering whether the tax incentive 
applies to computer programs.  The development of websites, internet sales systems, or 
customer satisfaction questionnaires is accordingly not eligible for the deduction as these 
constitute market research, sales or marketing promotion.  Software packages developed 
for administration, human resources or accounting purposes are similarly excluded from 
the tax-incentive scheme as they constitute management or internal business processes.” 
The Interpretation Note goes on to state that: 
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“Research into developing software for management and internal business processes will 
therefore not be eligible for a deduction.  In this regard it is irrelevant whether such 
software is developed for use in-house or is developed for the purpose of sale152 to end-
users.” 
From the above it is clear that SARS interprets the “management and internal 
business process” exclusion to be all-embracing, i.e. to apply to both programs 
developed for in-house use as well as programs developed with the intention of sale 
or licensing to third parties.   
Such an interpretation appears to effectively destroy the incentive given to computer 
programmers by Treasury as mentioned by Margo.  This is due to the fact that: 
“By their very nature, computer programs typically fall within the category ‘management 
or internal business processes’.”153   
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the intention of the legislature is the determining factor in 
construing any ‘taxing’ provision.  The intention of the lawgiver with the relevant 
exclusion will therefore be studied below. 
6.3. Intent of the Lawgiver 
Consultants to treasury, Sibanda & Zantwijk made the following statement in the 
R&D Discussion document released by them: 
“By their very nature, computer programs typically fall within the category ‘management 
and internal business processes.’  However, Treasury has indicated that where a 
computer program is developed for more than one sale or licence, this exclusion will not 
apply.  But this is not a legislated test, …”154 
From a perusal of the Explanatory Memorandum released by Treasury on the 
introduction of section 11D into the Income Tax Act, no evidence could be found in 
support of the above statement of Sibanda & Zantwijk, i.e. that Treasury indicated 
                                                 
152
  In this regard refer to the “multiple sales intention” requirement as discussed under the Australian 
legislation provisions in 6.4.1.2 Computer Software and the “multiple sale” requirement, below. 
153
  Sibanda & Zantwijk S11D: R&D Tax Incentive – Discussion Document (2007)9. 
154
  Sibanda & Zantwijk S11D: R&D Tax Incentive – Discussion Document (2007) 9. 
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that where a computer program is developed for more than one sale or licence, the 
exclusion does not apply.  The Explanatory Memorandum merely states that: 
“Other forms of knowledge falling outside the incentive have been specified and relate to:  
(a) the prospecting for minerals or exploration for oil and gas, (b) the management and 
enhancement of internal business processes, (c) trade mark creation, (d) social science 
and humanities, and (e) market research, sales or marketing promotion.”155 
However, as Sibanda & Zantwijk were consultants to Treasury on this legislation, the 
above statement made by them should carry some weight in this regard as the full 
extent of the discussions held with Treasury were not necessary adopted in the 
Explanatory Memorandum. 
One can otherwise deduce from the Explanatory Memorandum issued by Treasury 
that the intention of the lawgiver with the introduction of section 11D as a whole was 
to: 
“….ensure that local R&D is not at a global competitive disadvantage.”156 
It is therefore submitted, that in an attempt to ascertain Treasury’s intention with 
regards to the above exclusion as interpreted in the context of computer program 
development, one should look at the global trend set by the R&D legislation of other 
countries in this regard.  The goal of Treasury with the introduction of section 11D 
was to place South Africa on an equal footing with the rest of the global R&D arena.  
An interpretation securing such an outcome will therefore be justified and in line with 
the goal sought to be achieved by Treasury. 
Hence, the R&D provisions regarding eligible R&D activities (specifically relating to 
computer program development) of the following tax jurisdictions will be studied 
below:   
- Australia; 
- the UK; and 
- Canada. 
                                                 
155
  National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2006 8. 
156
  National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 20068. 
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Section 11D of the Income Tax Act will be compared with the R&D regime of the 
above countries in order to arrive at an interpretation which will place South Africa on 
an equal footing with the rest of the global arena. 
6.4. The global R&D arena 
6.4.1. Australia 
6.4.1.1. Eligible R&D activities  
Section 73B(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA 1936) defines 
“research and development” to mean: 
“(a) systematic, investigative and experimental activities that involve innovation or high 
levels of technical risk and are carried on for the purpose of: 
(i) acquiring new knowledge (whether or not that knowledge will have a specific 
practical application); or 
(ii) creating new or improved materials, products, devices, processes or services; or 
 (b) other activities that are carried on for a purpose directly related to the carrying on of 
activities of the kind referred to in paragraph (a).” 
The development of computer software will therefore qualify as an eligible R&D for 
purposes of the R&D tax concession provided that the software development entails 
systematic, investigative and experimental activities, it is novel in its application or 
has some novel aspect in the way of its functions and it involves the solving of a 
technical problem which is not readily apparent to an appropriately skilled and 
experienced software developer.  Prior to the ITAA amendments which took effect 1 
June 2010, software development had to adhere to an additional requirement in 
order to qualify as an eligible R&D activity.  This additional requirement was referred 
to as the “multiple sale” requirement and will be discussed below. 
Section 73B(2C) of the ITAA 1936 specifically excludes certain activities from eligible 
R&D activities, but it does not contain an exclusion similar to the ‘management or 
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internal business process’ exclusion contained in the South African R&D tax 
legislation.   
6.4.1.2. Computer Software and the “multiple sale” requirement 
Prior to the draft legislation which was introduced into law by the Australian 
Government as from 1 July 2010, the development of computer software had to 
satisfy the “multiple sale”157 requirement in order to qualify as an eligible R&D 
activity. 
The “multiple sale” requirement read as follow: 
“For the purposes of the definition of research and development activities in subsection 
(1), activities carried on by or on behalf of an eligible company by way of the development 
of computer software shall not be taken to be systematic, investigative and experimental 
activities unless the computer software is developed for the purpose, or for purposes that 
include the purpose, of sale, rent, licence, hire or lease to 2 or more non-associates of the 
company (counting a non-associate of the company and the associates of such a non-
associate together as one person).”158    
Therefore, where software development comprises the systematic, investigative and 
experimental activities of a project, the taxpayer must be able to demonstrate that it 
meets the “multiple sale” requirement in order to qualify for the R&D tax 
concession.159  The development of computer software for ‘management and internal 
business processes’ will therefore qualify for the R&D tax concession provided that 
the taxpayer meets the “multiple sale” requirement.  In other words, the development 
of software for in-house management and internal business processes will therefore 
not qualify for the concession.  
However, during September 2009 the Treasury Department of the Australian 
Government released a Consultation Paper in which it presented a case for a reform 
                                                 
157
  Subsection 73B(2A) of the ITAA 1936. 
158
  Subsection 73B(2A) of the ITAA 1936. 
159
  The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in joint concession with AusIndustry released a guide on the 
R&D Tax Concession of Australia in order to assist taxpayers in identifying possible claims.  
According to this guide the ATO also accepts that the multiple sale test is met where the software 
is sold or licensed to a separate entity whose intention is multiple sale. (Australian Taxation Office 
The R&D Guide on the R&D Tax Concession Version 4.3 (2010)). 
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of the R&D tax incentive as it then was.  The paper invited stakeholders to suggest 
alternative approaches to the current treatment of software as part of the new R&D 
tax incentive and also contained the following comments in this regard: 
“To be eligible for the current R&D tax concession, software activities need to meet a 
multiple sales test in addition to meeting the normal definition of eligible R&D activity.  
The multiple sales test was intended to limit government assistance for software R&D to 
claims where a firm sold the software that was produced, effectively excluding support for 
in-house software development. 
However, it is important to note that when the multiple sales provisions were put into 
place some 30 years ago, the extent of development of e-commerce was not fully 
appreciated.  The Government now considers that the current multiple sales test has 
become an outdated articulation of policy intent as it relates to software.”160  
BDO Kendalls (Australia) Ltd, Australia’s fifth largest Audit firm, made the following 
submission to Treasury in reply to the above Treasury Consultation Paper: 
“While the use of computers and software in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s was 
confined to relatively small segments of the community, …the computer has now become 
a ubiquitous part of business life.  Indeed, failing to use computers to at least a small 
degree to provide a conduit to potential customers and to manage the affairs of the 
business poses the potential to lead to the rapid demise of a business.  Computers and 
software have now become an essential part of business competitiveness, efficiency and 
performance.  
Advancements in computer software are occurring at an exponential rate.  Hand-in-hand 
with this advancement is the increasing complexities and risks associated with the use 
and development of software.  Identity fraud and general software security, particularly in 
the online environment, are presenting ever increasing commercial threats.  In order to 
ensure consumer confidence and reduce the ongoing costs associated with software 
security issues, continued R&D in the software engineering field is essential. 
The question must then be asked, why should R&D involving the development of 
software be subject to specific eligibility rules?  Consider a manufacturer that develops a 
physical asset that will be used by the manufacturer to produce goods which are sold to 
consumers.  The asset is not licensed or sold to consumers and will only provide direct 
benefits to the company.  Technological advancements and IP developed during the 
                                                 
160
  Australian Government (Treasury Department) The New Research and Development Tax 
Incentive – Consultation Paper (2009). 
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development of the asset will, no doubt, be closely protected and guarded, limiting any 
direct flow on to consumers.  The commercial exploitation of the asset will be limited to 
the production of goods….  
To ensure productive advancements in software engineering and development continues, 
access to the R&D tax concession for software development should be on a level playing 
field with all other eligible R&D activities and not subject to archaic and now arbitrary 
restrictions such as the multiple sale criteria.”161 
On 31 March 2010, the Australian Government released revised exposure draft 
legislation for the new R&D tax concession.  According to the revised exposure draft 
the “multiple sales” test for software R&D was removed from the Act effective 1 July 
2010.  Most software R&D would therefore be subject to the same rules as all other 
kinds of R&D.  However, certain in-house software activities will be excluded from 
core R&D and will therefore be subject to the dominant purpose test for supporting 
R&D.  The dominant purpose test pertains to supporting R&D activities and it 
determines that supporting R&D activities will be eligible for the R&D tax concession 
provided that it is directly related to an eligible core R&D activity. 
6.4.1.3. Comparison with SA legislation 
By removing the “multiple sales” test from the R&D tax legislation, the Australian 
Government acknowledged the fact that the test had become archaic in a business 
environment driven by computers and information technology.  The R&D tax 
concession of Australia had fallen behind the global trend in R&D tax incentive 
practices and the Government of Australia realised that in order to ensure that 
Australia remains an attractive R&D prospective; the R&D concession had to be 
amended in order to be more attractive for potential investors.  As a result hereof, 
the development of software for in-house use is now eligible for the R&D tax 
concession provided that it meets the other criteria for eligibility. 
Therefore, under the new R&D tax regime in Australia, software developed for 
‘management or internal business processes’ is eligible for the Australian R&D tax 
concession irrespective of whether the software is developed for in-house use or for 
                                                 
161
  BDO Kendalls (Australia) Ltd Submission – The New Research and Development Tax Incentive 
(2009). 
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the purpose of sale or licensing.  Under the previous regime, such software would 
only be eligible if it satisfied the ‘multiple sales’ test. 
However, under South African legislation, software (i.e. computer programs) 
developed for ‘management or internal business processes’ do not qualify as an 
eligible R&D activity.  According to SARS’ interpretation of the exclusion provision, 
the exclusion extends to the development of such computer programs even if the 
purpose of such development is sale or licensing to unrelated third parties.   In no 
event would computer programs relating to ‘management or internal business 
processes’ be eligible for the section 11D tax incentive if SARS’ interpretation is to 
be enforced. 
SARS’ interpretation places South African programmers at an obvious disadvantage 
compared to programmers in Australia - a result in gross conflict with the goal sought 
by the South African Treasury. 
6.4.2. United Kingdom 
6.4.2.1. Eligible R&D activities 
R&D is defined in section 837A162 as following generally accepted accounting 
practice.  Furthermore, the section provides that the Treasury may issue regulations 
that modify this definition for tax purposes.  The regulations which have been made 
refer to guidelines by the Secretary of State and are generally referred to as the DTI 
Guidelines (or, now, the BIS guidelines).163 
Essentially, any activities which directly contribute to a project undertaken to achieve 
an advance in science and technology through the resolution of a scientific or 
technological uncertainty are R&D activities for tax purposes.  Certain qualifying 
                                                 
162
  Refer Part XIX of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. 
163
  Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs CIRD81300 – R&D Tax Relief: Conditions To Be Satisfied: The 
Definition of R&D for Tax Purposes (2009). 
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indirect activities related to the project are also eligible for the R&D tax 
concession.164   
The arts, humanities and social sciences (including economics) are generally 
excluded from being eligible R&D activities for tax purposes.165  The UK does not 
contain an exclusion similar to the ‘management or internal business process’ 
exclusion contained in South African R&D tax legislation. 
6.4.2.2. DTI guidelines as applicable to software 
The Secretary of State issued Circular CIRD81960166 on the conditions to be 
satisfied in order to qualify for R&D tax relief as specifically applying to software 
development.  The circular provides that expenditure on the creation of software can 
be R&D within the DTI guidelines in two ways, i.e.: 
- Software that is used as a tool in a larger R&D project;167 or 
- The development of the software must be the goal of the R&D project. 
Where software is developed as a tool for direct use in a larger R&D project, the 
development of the software will qualify as R&D irrespective of whether it involves a 
specific advance in science or technology.  It is merely required that the larger R&D 
project qualify as an eligible R&D activity.168 
Where the development of the software is the goal of the R&D project, i.e. it does not 
serve as mere supporting activity, the following requirements must be adhered to in 
order for the software development to be eligible: 
- the project must seek to achieve an advance in science or technology;  
- the activities must directly contribute to achieving the advance through the 
resolution of a scientific or technological uncertainty; and 
                                                 
164
  Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs CIRD81900 – R&D Tax Relief: Conditions To Be Satisfied: DTI 
Guidelines (2004) (2009). 
165
  Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs CIRD81960 – R&D Tax Relief: Conditions To Be Satisfied: DTI 
Guidelines (2004): Application to Software (2009).  
166
  Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs CIRD81960.  
167
  The development of the software serves as a supporting activity to the R&D project. 
168
  Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs CIRD81960. 
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- there must be an advance in overall knowledge or capability in a field of 
science or technology, not just the company’s own state of knowledge or 
capability alone.169 
The development of software will be eligible whether it is intended for in-house use, 
sale or licensing provided that the above mentioned requirements are met.170   
6.4.2.3. Comparison with SA legislation 
The development of software for ‘management or internal business processes’ will 
be eligible for the R&D tax credit in terms of the UK R&D tax legislation.   
However, as mentioned above, South African legislation prohibits software (i.e. 
computer programs) developed for ‘management and internal business processes’ 
from qualifying as an eligible R&D activity.  SARS interprets this exclusion to extend 
to the development of such computer programs even if the purpose of such 
development is sale or licensing to unrelated third parties.   In no event would 
computer programs relating to ‘management or internal business processes’ be 
eligible for the section 11D tax incentive according to SARS.  
Again the interpretation of SARS will place South African programmers at a severe 
disadvantage when compared with UK programmers. 
6.4.3. Canada 
6.4.3.1. Eligible R&D activities 
Section 248171 defines scientific research and development (SR&ED) to mean: 
“systematic investigation or research that is carried out in a field of science or technology 
by means of experiment or analysis that is  
(a) basic research, namely work undertaken for the advancement of scientific knowledge 
without a specific practical application in view,  
                                                 
169
  Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs CIRD81960. 
170
  Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs CIRD81960. 
171
  Refer Part XVII of the Canadian Income Tax Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)). 
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(b) applied research, namely work undertaken for the advancement of scientific 
knowledge with a specific practical application in view, or  
(c) experimental development, namely work undertaken for the purpose of achieving 
technological advancement for the purpose of creating new, or improving existing, 
materials, devices, products or processes, including incremental improvements 
thereto, 
and, in applying this definition in respect of a taxpayer, includes 
(d) work undertaken by or on behalf of the taxpayer with respect to engineering, design, 
operations research, mathematical analysis, computer programming, data collection, 
testing or psychological research, where the work is commensurate with the needs, 
and directly in support, of work described in paragraph (a), (b), or (c) that is 
undertaken in Canada by or on behalf of the taxpayer…” 
Canada does not contain an exclusion similar to the ‘management or internal 
business process’ exclusion contained in South African R&D tax legislation. 
6.4.3.2. Eligibility of software development 
The Canadian Revenue Agency issued R&D guidelines172 for the eligibility of 
software development.  According to these guidelines the development of software 
must satisfy the following three criteria in order for the project to be considered 
SR&ED: 
- The project must seek to effect an advance in computer science or 
information technology;  
- The above advance must be made by solving a scientific or technological 
uncertainty in software development which is not readily apparent to 
appropriately skilled and experienced software developers; and 
- The project must demonstrate a systematic investigation or search by 
experiment or analysis. 
Provided the above requirements are met, the development of computer software for 
‘management or internal business processes’ will be eligible for the R&D tax credit 
                                                 
172
  Canadian Revenue Agency IC97-1: Scientific Research and Experimental Development – 
Administrative Guidelines for Software Development (2003).  
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irrespective of whether the software was developed for in-house use, sale or 
licensing. 
6.4.3.3. Comparison with SA legislation 
As the case with the comparison to the Australian and the UK legislation above, the 
South African programmers are in an unfavourable position concerning R&D tax 
incentives when compared with their Canadian colleagues.  
6.5. Conclusion 
The business environment has undergone immense transformation over the last 20 
years and is now predominantly ruled by computer science and information 
technology.  In order to stay competitive in this global arena it is imperative that 
countries stay abreast of development in the fields of science and technology 
especially pertaining to information technology.  Countries who consider themselves 
pioneers in R&D tax incentives have acknowledged this need and have 
consequently amended their R&D tax legislation to provide greater incentives in the 
field of software development.  A recent example hereof is the removal by the 
Australian Government of the ‘multiple sale” test as eligibility criteria for software 
development. 
South Africa has only recently upped the ante regarding the provision of tax 
incentives for research and development carried out in South Africa.  The intention of 
Treasury with the introduction of section 11D was to ensure that local R&D is not at a 
global competitive disadvantage.  However, as shown above, the interpretation 
suggested by SARS in Interpretation 50 regarding the development of computer 
programs places South Africa at a great disadvantage when compared with the R&D 
tax legislation of countries such as Australia, the UK and Canada. 
SARS is of the view that the ‘management and internal business processes’ 
exclusion applies to any computer program developed with this application 
irrespective of whether the program is developed for the purpose of in-house use, 
sale or licensing.  However other stakeholders are of the opinion that such a view is 
at odds with global practice (as was shown above) and that the exclusion should 
enjoy a much wider interpretation: 
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“This narrow interpretation by SARS conflicts with global practice, more relevant to bona 
fide 3rd party developers, being that systems developed for multiple sales i.e. software 
development for purposes of ‘sale, rent, licence, hire or lease of two or more non 
associates of the company’ with sufficient documentary evidence of these multiple sales, 
would render expenditure for development of the system deductible.  However, as SARS 
correctly points out, no ‘multiple sales’ test is included in our legislation.  Therefore, were 
a taxpayer do develop software for multiple sales, that taxpayer would still need to meet 
the other requirements of s 11D, such as the scientific & technological requirement and 
the exclusions under s 11D(5), before associated expenditure will be deductible.  Multiple 
sales is a factor our Courts may well take into consideration when examining computer 
programs, but it is not a specific allowable deduction in our legislation.”173 
SARS correctly points out that section 11D does not contain a specific ‘multiple 
sales’ requirement, however, when one attempts to interpret the said exclusion, i.e. 
‘management or internal business processes’ as applied to the eligibility of computer 
program development, the intention of the lawgiver should be given effect to.  
Treasury introduced section 11D into our Act to ensure that South Africa is not at a 
global disadvantage concerning R&D.   Therefore, an interpretation increasing the 
ambit of eligibility for computer program development is well-advised.   
It is submitted that the exclusion should be construed to pertain solely to computer 
programs developed for in-house use relating to management and internal business 
processes.  Computer programs which are developed to be used by the taxpayer for 
administration, human resource or accounting purposes will therefore not qualify for 
the R&D tax incentive.   
However, computer programs developed by the taxpayer for ‘management and 
internal business processes’ applications with the intention of selling or licensing the 
programs to unrelated third parties, should qualify as eligible R&D activities.   
It is submitted that such an interpretation will promote the goal sought to be achieved 
by Treasury as it will place South African programmers on a more level playing field 
when compared with computer programmers in Australia, the UK and Canada.  
                                                 
173
  Price An Analysis of the South African Tax Incentive for Research and Development and an 
International Comparison University of Kwazulu-Natal (2010) 26.  
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                                                          CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
 
Section 11B of the Income Tax Act was introduced during 2006 and passed into law 
in February 2007.  From the numerous amendments made to this section since its 
introduction into law, it is evident that the section is in the process of maturing from 
its adolescent state of flux.   
SARS spent three years on the finalisation of its interpretation of the section.  This 
serves as proof of the complex and highly technical nature of the incentive.  The 
resultant Interpretation Note 50 issued in 2009 sparked wide-spread controversy 
among many patent attorneys and tax consultants.  Of particular heartache to the 
taxpayers is the construction SARS has placed on the concepts of “novelty” and 
“obviousness” as well as the narrow interpretation awarded to the “management or 
internal business process” exclusion as specifically applied to the development of 
computer programs.    
The purpose of this dissertation was to provide greater clarity on the above 
mentioned “grey areas” of the R&D tax incentive.   
As no tax jurisprudence was available on the R&D tax incentive at the time of this 
dissertation, the study had to be governed by established principles of statutory 
interpretation.   
Chapter 2 found that it was trite law to seek and give effect to the intention of the 
legislature in construing any provision of a statute before the ordinary meaning is 
awarded thereto.  According to the Explanatory Memorandum issued on the 
proposed enactment of section 11D the intention with the new incentive was to 
stimulate R&D activities of a scientific and technological nature which would result in 
new knowledge and not represent mere routine learning activities as part of an 
ongoing process.  It is clear from this description that Treasury’s aim was to 
incentivise only those R&D activities that would result in a scientific and 
technological advance in the relevant field.  The aim of this study was therefore to 
award a construction to the so-called “grey areas” which would give effect to the 
evident aim of the legislature.   
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The first “grey area” pertains to the meaning and scope of the “discovery of new, 
practical and non-obvious information” as one of the eligible R&D activities listed in 
the Income Tax Act.  As “novelty” and “obviousness” lie at the heart of patent law, a 
number of IP jurisprudence exists on the meaning of the above concepts in terms of 
Patent Law.   
Chapter 2 investigated whether the meaning of “new” and “non-obvious” could be 
interpreted for tax purposes by having recourse to the abundance of IP jurisprudence 
on the matter.  It was concluded that such a reference to IP jurisprudence is justified 
as section 11D itself makes reference to, and relies on, the terms as defined in the 
Patents Act.  Furthermore, it was stated by Sibanda & Zantwijk (consultants to 
Treasury on this section) that one of the motivations for the insertion of section 
11D(1)(a)174 into the Income Tax Act was the fact that the Patents Act denies 
“discoveries” the status of an invention.  Thus, it is submitted that the intention of the 
legislature was to award discoveries the opportunity to qualify for the R&D tax 
incentive allowance.  Discoveries are not regularised and seeing as the requirements 
set for discoveries by the R&D tax incentive reflects the patent requirements set for 
inventions by the Patents Act, Chapter 2 found it just to consult IP jurisprudence on 
the meaning of “new” and “non-obvious”. 
Hence chapter 3 set forth with an investigation into the meaning of “novel” as applied 
to patentable inventions in terms of Patent law.  The chapter concluded that an 
invention is regarded as novel if it did not form part of the state of the art immediately 
prior to the date of its invention.  The state of the art was found to comprise all matter 
which had been made available to the public by written or oral description, by use or 
in any other way.  Prior art is regarded as being available to the public if it is possible 
for members of the public to gain knowledge of the content without any bar of 
confidentiality restricting the use or dissemination of such knowledge.   
Chapter 3 outlined that prior art will describe the invention under challenge if it sets 
forth in words or recites the essential integers of the invention in such a way that the 
same or substantially the same invention is identifiable or perceptible and hence 
made known, or the same or substantially the same thing can be made from that 
                                                 
174
  i.e. the “discovery of new, practical and non-obvious information” as eligible R&D activity. 
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description.  It was found that if the publication fails to recite a single integer, the 
prior publication cannot be said to describe the invention claimed to be novel.  
Chapter 3 also found that the prior publication must be contained in a single 
publication and should be construed on the date of its publication to the exclusion of 
information subsequently discovered.  It was concluded that an invention will pass 
the novelty requirement if, upon comparison with the prior art, it shows a real 
difference with such art. 
Chapter 4 studied the meaning of “non-obvious” as applied to patentable inventions 
in terms of Patent Law.  The test formulated by our courts to test for obviousness is 
whether an ordinary person skilled in the art would have easily solved the problem 
faced by the inventor by using his intelligence and having regard to what was 
common knowledge in the art at the time.  Common knowledge refers to the working 
knowledge possessed by the ordinary worker.  It does not encompass all published 
knowledge or prior art.  The ordinary worker may however, in his quest to solve the 
problem presented to him, have recourse to prior art, but it is presumed that reliance 
on his common knowledge alone would have easily led him to find the answer 
sought. 
In assessing obviousness, the courts have made it clear that the only real question 
to be asked is whether the step taken was an obvious one.  Secondary factors such 
as a significant advance in the field, the production of a practical result or the 
achievement of commercial success may only serve to lessen the burden of proof, 
but it does not in itself prove that the invention claimed is non-obvious in nature. 
As mentioned above, the R&D tax incentive deals with a “discovery” of information, 
whereas the Patents Act only pertains to “inventions”.  Discoveries are denied the 
status of an invention in terms of the Patents Act.  Chapter 5 therefore investigated 
whether the meanings of “new” and “non-obvious”, as laid out by IP jurisprudence, 
could vis-à-vis be adopted for purposes of section 11D. 
Chapter 5 commenced with a study of the ordinary dictionary meaning of a 
“discovery” and an “invention”.  The ordinary meaning of a “discovery” involves the 
act of being the first to find something which existed before, whereas an “invention” 
results in the creation of something which did not exist before.   
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It was however concluded that the difference in nature between a “discovery” and an 
“invention” does not hinder the adoption of the meaning of “novel” and “non-obvious” 
for purposes of the R&D tax incentive.  This is due to the fact that a discovery, like 
an invention, will be regarded as “new” if it did not form part of the state of the art 
prior to the discovery thereof.  The thing discovered will have existed prior to the 
discovery thereof, but as it did not form part of the public domain prior to the 
discovery thereof, the discoverer will have been the first to find such thing.  Likewise, 
the difference in nature between a discovery and an invention was found to have no 
influence on the meaning of “non-obvious”.  The meaning of “non-obvious” can be 
applied to a discovery without any difficulty.  
Chapter 5 also studied the ordinary meaning of the words “novel” and “non-obvious”.  
Something is novel if it is strikingly new or unusual.  The ordinary meaning of “novel” 
has the effect that the discovery of information which formed part of the public 
domain prior to the discovery thereof will still qualify for the tax incentive provided 
that it was not commonly encountered or observed in the public domain.  Something 
is non-obvious if it is not easily perceived or understood by the ordinary man.  The 
ordinary meaning of non-obvious has the effect that the discovery of information 
which is obvious to a person skilled in the art will still qualify for the tax incentive 
provided that the information discovered is not obvious to the ordinary man. 
Chapter 5 concluded with the submission that the adoption of the ordinary meaning 
of “novel” and “non-obvious” will result in section 11D(1)(a) having an ambit which is 
far greater than the legislature intended it to be.  The intention of the legislature was 
to stimulate R&D activity that would lead to an advance in the fields of science and 
technology and not merely encompass routine activities as part of an ongoing 
process.  By adopting the ordinary meaning of the above concepts the goal sought 
by Treasury would not be achieved, as the taxpayer would merely opt for routine 
R&D activities in order to qualify for the incentive rather than performing complex 
R&D activities. 
Thus, in order to give effect to the intention of the legislature, it was found that 
“novel” and “non-obvious” should mutatis mutandis adopt the meaning awarded to it 
by IP legislation. 
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Chapter 6 dealt with the second “grey issue” of the new incentive, i.e. the 
development of computer programs read with the “management and internal 
business process” exclusion found in section 11D(5)(b).  The wide-spread 
controversy surrounding this contentious issue resulted from the release of SARS’ 
Interpretation note in August 2009.   SARS is of the view that the ‘management or 
internal business process’ exclusion applies to the development of any computer 
program with this application irrespective of whether the program is developed for 
the purpose of in-house use, sale or licensing.  However, other stakeholders are of 
the opinion that such a view is at odds with global practice and that the exclusion 
should enjoy a much wider interpretation. 
As per the Explanatory Memorandum issued by Treasury on the introduction of 
section 11D, the intention with the introduction of this section was to ensure that 
South Africa is not at a global disadvantage concerning R&D.  Chapter 6 therefore 
aimed to place a construction on the said exclusion that would aid in achieving the 
goal sought by Treasury. 
As a result hereof, international R&D provisions relating to computer (or software) 
development were consulted.  Specifically the R&D tax credit provisions of Australia, 
the UK and Canada were studied as these countries profess to be pioneers in the 
field of R&D tax legislation.  It was found that, in terms of the current R&D tax 
legislation of all three countries, the development of computer programs would be 
eligible for the R&D tax incentive provided that an advance in the field of science and 
technology is achieved by way of systematic, investigative and experimental 
activities, and that such an advance was achieved by solving a scientific or 
technological uncertainty which was not readily apparent to an appropriately skilled 
software developer.  
From the above it is clear that South African computer programmers are grossly 
disadvantaged by the interpretation of SARS which was proven to be at odds with 
global practice.   SARS correctly points out that section 11D does not contain a 
specific “multiple sales requirement”, however the counter argument is that such a 
provision is not required if a wide interpretation of the said exclusion is to be 
adopted.  In other words, if the exclusion is to be interpreted to only exclude 
computer programs developed for in-house management or internal business 
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process use, then the inclusion of a “multiple sales requirement” in the Income Tax 
Act would be redundant. 
Chapter 6 concluded with a submission that the exclusion should be construed to 
exclude only the development of computer programs for in-house management or 
business process use.  Therefore, the development of computer programs with this 
application, but for the purpose of intended sale or licensing, should not fall within 
the ambit of the exclusion.  It is submitted that such an interpretation will be in 
harmony with the intention of the lawgiver and will achieve the goal sought by 
Treasury. 
Herma Keshav, in his article “How SA’s R&D tax incentive stacks up against the 
US’s”.175 noted that according to a report dated September 2006, by Dr Robert D 
Atkinson of the International Technology and Innovation Foundation, the United 
States provided the most generous tax treatment of R&D in the late 1980s and early 
1990s among OECD nations.  By 2004 they had fallen to the 17th most generous 
regime.  This is due to the fact that many countries, over the years, have improved 
their R&D tax incentive schemes.  It is evident that the United States did not keep up 
the pace. 
In a global R&D arena that is ever competitive and aware of the value of a generous 
R&D tax incentive, the interpretation placed on section 11D by our Courts will be 
crucial.  An interpretation that is too restrictive in nature will result in South Africa 
driving a backseat to countries such as Australia, the UK and Canada.   
This study concludes with the following: 
“If we are to keep pace in the R&D race, the learning we in SA can take from the US R&D 
experience is that we must keep track of both the impact of the R&D tax incentive on the 
country’s R&D spend – and also compare its growth in R&D on an international scale”.176 
 
 
                                                 
175
  Keshav “How SA’s R&D Tax Incentive Stacks Up Against the US’s” 2008 Moneyweb Tax. 
176
  Keshav “How SA’s R&D Tax Incentive Stacks Up Against the US’s” 2008 Moneyweb Tax. 
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